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The threat landscape of the Internet has evolved drastically into an environment
where malware are increasingly developed by financially motivated cybercriminal
groups who mirror legitimate businesses in their structure and processes. These
groups develop sophisticated malware with the aim of transforming persistent
control over large numbers of infected machines into profit. Recent developments
have shown that malware authors seek to hide their Command and Control channels
by implementing custom application layer protocols and using custom encryption
algorithms. This technique effectively thwarts conventional pattern-based detection
mechanisms.
This thesis presents network fingerprints, a novel way of performing network-based
detection of encrypted Command and Control channels. The goal of the work
was to produce a proof of concept system that is able to generate accurate and
reliable network signatures for this purpose. The thesis presents and explains the
individual phases of an analysis pipeline that was built to process and analyze
malware network traffic and to produce network fingerprint signatures.
The analysis system was used to generate network fingerprints that were deployed
to an intrusion detection system in real-world networks for a test period of 17
days. The experimental phase produced 71 true positive detections and 9 false
positive detections, and therefore proved that the established technique is capable
of performing detection of targeted encrypted Command and Control channels.
Furthermore, the effects on the performance of the underlying intrusion detection
system were measured. These results showed that network fingerprints induce an
increase of 2-9% to the packet loss and a small increase to the overall computational
load of the intrusion detection system.
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Internetin uhkaympäristön radikaalin kehittymisen myötä edistyksellisiä haittaoh-
jelmia kehittävät kyberrikollisryhmät ovat muuttuneet järjestäytyneiksi ja talou-
dellista voittoa tavoitteleviksi organisaatioiksi. Nämä rakenteiltaan ja prosesseil-
taan laillisia yrityksiä muistuttavat organisaatiot pyrkivät saastuttamaan suuria
määriä tietokoneita ja saavuttamaan yhtämittaisen hallintakyvyn. Tutkimukset
ovat osoittaneet, että tuntemattomien salausmenetelmien ja uusien sovellustason
protokollien käyttö haittaohjelmien komento- ja hallintakanavien piilottamisek-
si tietoverkoissa ovat kasvussa. Tämänkaltaiset tekniikat vaikeuttavat oleellisesti
perinteisiä toistuviin kuvioihin perustuvia havaitsemismenetelmiä.
Tämä työ esittelee salattujen komento- ja hallintakanavien havaitsemiseen suunni-
tellun uuden konseptin, verkkosormenjäljet. Työn tavoitteena oli toteuttaa proto-
tyyppijärjestelmä, joka analysoi ja prosessoi haittaohjelmaliikennettä, sekä kykenee
tuottamaan tarkkoja ja tehokkaita haittaohjelmakohtaisia verkkosormenjälkitun-
nisteita. Työ selittää verkkosormenjälkien teorian ja käy yksityiskohtaisesti läpi
kehitetyn järjestelmän eri osiot ja vaiheet.
Järjestelmästä tuotetut verkkosormenjäljet asennettiin 17 päiväksi oikeisiin tieto-
verkkoihin osaksi tunkeilijan havaitsemisjärjestelmää. Testijakso tuotti yhteensä 71
oikeaa haittaohjelmahavaintoa sekä 9 väärää havaintoa. Menetelmän käyttöönoton
vaikutukset tunkeilijan havaitsemisjärjestelmän suorituskykyyn olivat 2-9% kasvu
pakettihäviössä ja pieni nousu laskennallisessa kokonaiskuormituksessa. Tulokset
osoittavat, että kehitetty järjestelmä kykenee onnistuneesti analysoimaan haittaoh-
jelmaliikennettä sekä tuottamaan salattuja komento- ja hallintakanavia havaitsevia
verkkosormenjälkiä.
Avainsanat: haittaohjelma, tunkeilijan havaitsemisjärjestelmä, komento- ja oh-
jauskanava, verkkosormenjälki
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11 Introduction
Today modern societies are dependent on digital information infrastructures to store,
process and transmit data. Critical organs of these societies, such as government
offices, industrial plants and power grids, are reliant on the availability and reliability
of computer systems that connect and control crucial structures. These computer
systems are part of what can be described as the global cyberspace. The proliferation
of personal computers and portable smart devices has broadened the cyberspace
to encompass all digital devices that communicate over networks. This cyberspace
provides the environment for benevolent actors, e.g. individuals, companies and
governments, to act as part of the society and to carry out everyday tasks to progress
welfare socially and economically. However, at the same it also provides means
for malicious actors to pursue their own agenda, which can take its form e.g. as
cybercrime, espionage or terrorism. Direct or indirect connections to subsets of the
cyberspace, such as the Internet, can expose systems to these cyberthreats imposed
by the malicious actors.
Cyberthreats have been a known problem for a long time, but the threat landscape
has evolved drastically in the past two decades. An important factor in this evolution
is the diversification of the malicious actors. The stereotype of a hacker living in
a basement and writing malware for the sake of fun, causing mischeaf or gaining
“street credibility” is no longer in effect [1–3]. Frequent discoveries of security holes
and vulnerabilities, which are an inevitable side effect of the digitalization of the
society, have opened a lucrative opportunity for criminal groups to capitalize on. As
a result, the actors responsible for recent notorious malware are often cybercriminal
organizations that mirror legitimate businesses in their organizational structure and
processes in the effort to reach maximal financial profit [2]. Targeting large masses of
Internet users rather than isolated entities, such as companies or individuals, exposes
the largest attack surface for attackers and hence any machine that is exposed by
a vulnerability can be seen as a potential source for a malware infection. More
organized and diverse malicious actors have thus increased the probabilitiy with
which a normal user can become a target of a cyberattack on the Internet.
In non-targeted malware distribution campaigns the goal of a successful infection
is often to subject the victims’ machine under the control of the malicious entity.
Such infected machines under the control of the same malicious entity are collectively
called a botnet and the controlling entity the botmaster [1, 4]. Botnets can function
as a multi purpose tool for cybercriminals to perform various tasks, such as sending
spam emails, performing distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks or stealing
private information, e.g. banking information or passwords [1, 4–8]. “Botnet as a
service” [1, 2] and similar schemes render it relatively simple for anyone to obtain
partial or full control of a botnet. Attributing responsibility for attacks has therefore
become problematic as anyone who is willing to spend as little as a few hundread
dollars can become a malicious actor on the Internet [2, 8].
A general requirement for achieving prolonged control over an infected machine
2is to establish and maintain a communication channel between the malicious actor
and the victim machine. This channel, termed a Command and Control (C&C,
C2) channel, can be used by the malicious entity to send commands or to transfer
updates to the malware, and to download collected data from the infected machine [9].
Many malware utilize application-layer protocols, such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) or Internet Relay Chat (IRC), as end-to-end carrier protocols to establish this
channel [10]. The practice of using standardized and well-defined higher-level protocols
typically introduces invariants into the network traffic that through observation of
consistent application by a malware can be used to identify and assign the malicious
communication to the specific threat. Modern botnets however, such as Fynloski,
Zeus P2P [11] and Virut, utilize lower-level non-descriptive carrier protocols, i.e.
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP), in their
C&C channels, and obscure the carried higher-level C&C protocol using custom
encryption algorithms. This reduces significantly the number of availabe invariants
in the network traffic and renders reliable detection of C&C channels of modern
botnets hard, if not impossible. [4, 12]
Network-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are security appliances that
monitor network traffic with the goal of detecting and intercepting malicious activity,
such as C&C channels. IDS systems are versatile platforms that typically implement
powerful functionality such as protocol dissection, flow reassembly, deep packet
inspection and file extraction from passing traffic [13]. Detection is performed by
applying special network signatures on the monitored traffic and raising alerts for
matches. These network signatures define constraints and thresholds for malicious
activity and are typically generated and distributed by professionals in the security
industry. Depending on the nature of an event, the system can for example respond
actively by blocking the traffic, or simply log the event and notify an administrator.
Deploying an IDS system can therefore provide an effective base for protecting a
network against various cyberthreats.
The inherent reliance of IDS systems on network signatures underlines the impor-
tance of maintaining a sufficiently large quantity and high quality signature base.
The amount and quality of signatures directly impacts the accuracy of performed
threat detection and thereby influences the level of achievable protection provided by
an IDS system. As a consequence, implementing a scalable process and infrastructure
that produces network signatures is an imperative requirement for any entity that
makes use of, or provides, IDS solutions. The rapid evolution of the threat landscape
necessitates a continuous development of these processes in order to produce new
detection capabilities against emerging threats. Recently, the gradual shift towards
encrypted malware communication and utilization of non-descriptive carrier protocols
has induced a need for new and innovative responses.
This thesis explores one possible approach for the detection of covert C&C
channels that employ custom encryption on top of non-descriptive carrier protocols.
The work focuses in developing a proof of concept analysis and signature generation
system that can be incorporated at the side of a commercial breach detection solution.
The goal is to develop a framework that can produce network signatures that are
capable of performing reliable and accurate detection against evasive malware without
3compromising performance. This goal is approached by specifying heuristics for the
detection of covert C&C channels, developing a feature extraction system that is able
to correlate network traffic and cluster network flows based on a set of defined criteria,
and translating this information into network signatures for the open source-based
Suricata IDS.
This document is organized in the following manner. In the next chapter the theo-
retical background of Command and Control infrastructures of malware are explained.
The chapter further discusses some commonly encountered evasion techniques that
malware employ to thwart detection efforts. In addition, the second chapter presents
the current state of the art and provides insights about the research that has been
done in this field. The third chapter describes the context and methodologies of the
work and defines the boundaries and expectations for the resulting system. Chapter
4 explains in detail the implementational specifics of the proof of concept signature
generation framework that is presented in this thesis. The products of the system
are deployed in real-world production environment networks to undergo qualitative
and quantitative testing and verification. Chapter 5 presents the results of the tests
and evaluates the performance achieved with the proof of concept system. The
chapter furthermore discusses the results and the available test environment. Finally,
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of the work.
42 Command and Control channels in mal-
ware
Advanced malware is characterized by the requirement for a reliable and robust
communication channel. The basic premise of such communication is that malware
infected machines must be capable of using a set of pre-defined methods and channels
to retrieve commands from the attacker and execute them. The ensemble of protocols,
network topology and operating model that fulfils this premise is called the Command
and Control infrastructure. At the simplest it comprises one or multiple servers and
a connecting network that functions as the means to transmit data from the infected
machine to the attacker. The C&C infrastucture can incorporate multiple C&C
channels that are defined by protocols and message structure, and intermediary
destinations used in the communication. [14, 15]
The establishment and use of Command and Control channels is an imperative
step in recent attacks. It identifies the stage in the life cycle of an attack where the
compromised system contacts back the attacker in order to receive commands and
to relay information, such as status updates or collected data. To detect and identify
malware C&C channels is therefore important from the defenders’ point of view in
preventing financial damage and theft of confidental data. The evolution of Command
and Control techniques has been largely driven by defense efforts to uncover and
detect malicious communication. This has developed into a constant battle between
malware writers and security professionals, where the former repeatedly comes up
with novel ways to perform C&C communication and evade detection efforts by the
latter. [14]
This chapter explains concepts behind Command and Control infrastructures
and how C&C channels are established in malware. The first section presents basic
principles of a prevalent threat class that employs C&C communication in the core
of its operations. The second section studies C&C channels from topological and
functional point of view and covers implementation methodologies that are commonly
employed by different malware. The fourth section illustrates different evasion and
anti-detection techniques that are frequently used by current malware to achieve
persistance and stealthiness. In the fifth section existing work is presented and
some already researched approaches are discussed. The last section provides a short
summary of the whole chapter.
2.1 Operational principles of Command and Control malware
The Internet of today exposes its users to a vast repertoire of rampant malware.
Cyber-threats have been a noted problem for a long time, but the threat landscape
of the Internet has evolved drastically in the past two decades. The earliest worms
and viruses started to emerge in the Internet in the 1990s and since then the number
of malware has continued to grow exponentially. Security vendors estimate that the
5number of distinct samples has increased from about 10, 000 in 1996 to hundreds of
millions in 2016 [16–18]. Part of this rapid growth can be attributed to the usage
of client and server polymorphism in malware, [16, 19] but part is also due to the
shift in the threat environment: cyber-crime has gradually evolved into a lucrative
business for criminals. This trend has introduced large groups of new players to the
malware scene who produce novel and more sophisticated threats [2, 3].
Malware leveraging Command and Control communication have become the
primary means for financially motivated cybercriminals to carry out their opera-
tions [1]. Well built C&C infrastructures offer versatile platforms that serve essential
purposes in the coordination and realization of various malicious tasks. Common
nefarious actions that feature C&C communication include activities such as sending
spam, launching DDoS attacks, stealing personal data and espionage [1, 5, 20]. One
general factor in the profit models of such activities is the continuity of the operation
or campaign [21]. This is tightly linked with the structural decisions taken in the
design phase that affect both the robustness and resilience of the C&C infrastructure
against defenders’ takedown efforts, and the properties that assure covertness against
detection.
Botnets form one of the most serious threats on the Internet and exemplify well
the types of malware that employ C&C infrastructures in their core. The term
botnet is used to describe networks of infected machines that are controlled by a
human operator, commonly known as the botmaster. A bots, i.e. the malware that
infects a machine, can then be used to perform various tasks under the control of the
botmaster. This process is illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts a typical life cycle of
a botnet [15]. The first phase, the infection phase, is usually continuous throughout
the existence of the botnet and overlaps with the other phases of the life cycle. In
this phase new machines are infected either through direct actions by the botmaster
or by indirect spreading efforts, e.g. by existing bots or other malware that installs
the bot on a victim’s machine. The second phase constitutes the commanding and
controlling of the botnet after its establishment. This phase and its components are
further discussed in the next section. Controlling the botnet over C&C channels
allows the botnet controller to use the power of the collective infections and to exert
it for malicious purposes, denoted by the third phase in the figure. [1, 4, 12, 15, 22]
The actors responsible for deploying and controlling bot networks are manifold
and often unambiguous. Attracted by financial profit, the malware industry has seen
an increase in organization of cybercriminal groups who mirror legitimate businesses
in organizational structure and processes striving for high efficiency and returns [2]. In
conformance with methods dictated by conventional business models, these criminal
groups sell their products and offer consultant services for setting up and operating
botnets thereby introducing new malicious actors to the scene [2]. Furthermore,
toolkits, such as Zeus bot [11, 23, 24], that are designed to streamline and automate
the process of creating a botnet, are distributed freely on Internet forums and
have contributed to the build-up of the number of unique variants and responsible
actors [25]. Malware produced by such toolkits often display indistinguishable
characteristics and mask the actors behind a generic implementation of the common
malware [24]. This commercialization and availability of sophisticated malware
61. INFECT
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Figure 1: Botnet life cycle.
frameworks has caused a shift in the malware scene where creating a botnet has
never been easier.
Due to the large number of malware and wide range of infection vectors, ending up
infected with a bot is increasingly more common and often inconspicuous. Resulting
from its broad use on the Internet, vulnerabilities in browsers are a major target
for attackers. Software bugs in browser plugins, such as Java, Flash or Silverlight,
are often subject to drive-by attacks, whose goal is to exploit an outdated and
vulnerable version of the plugin in order to load and execute a malicious binary.
This approach has been commercialized by cyber-criminals in the form of exploit
kits (EK) that combine and put together a large number of targeted exploits against
different versions of vulnerable browser plugins. Exploit kit developers offer infections
as a service where a malicious actor pays for the kit to exploit a vulnerability on
a machine and to install a malicious binary supplied by the actor. This effectively
hands over the control of the machine to the malicious actor, who is often embodied
by a botnet controller. These kind of drive-by attacks form a particularly prevalent
threat to Internet users as getting infected only requires a visit to a website that
hosts the malicious exploit script. [26]
Another significant source of infections is exploiting the human nature through
social engineering (SE). Social engineering is a process in which a malicious actor
convinces or tricks an unsuspecting user into performing an action that ends up
profiting the malicious actor at the expense of the user or another victim. At the
simplest the action can take its form in a phone call, where the caller impersonates
another person and requests information or an action from the person answering
the phone that would be authorized only to the real person. This principle can be
applied to email. In these instances the attacker sends an email with a malicious
attachment that upon opening exploits a vulnerability on the computer’s software
that opens it and installs a malware. These social engineering techniques are often
employed in combination with spam emails ensuring large-scale distribution and
7increased number of infections [11].
After a successful infection the bot may be ordered to perform a manifold of tasks.
These tasks are predominantly driven by motives that can be split into three categories:
financial profit, expansion of the botnet, and causing financial or operational harm to
a target. Financial profit can be generated in multiple ways when operating a botnet.
Commonly encountered examples include advertisement click fraud [27], harvesting
and selling confidential information from infected machines [1], and sending spam
emails [5]. [8] Botnet expansion can be sought for by e.g. attempting to infect
machines located on the local networks of existing bots or sending spam emails with
malicious attachments that infect recipients with a bot [11]. The third category
includes actions that disrupt operations of a targeted individual or organization often
causing financial damage and interruptions in service. The most common form of
these attacks are DDoS attacks where a botnet is instructed to direct continuous
network traffic to the victims network with the aim of saturating their routing systems
and effectively rendering the network unusable [6, 20].
Botnets pose a diverse and prevalent threat to the Internet and its users. Due
to the attractive financial possibilities of the malware business, new players are
likely to keep emerging to the scene. However, botnets are not the only class of
malware that both incorporate C&C infrastuctures and impose a serious threat.
Advanced persistent threats (APT) are a more recent threat that are characterized by
their persistence, high sophistication and targeted nature [14, 21]. Shaped by recent
events and often motivated by industrial or (geo)political espionage and exfiltration of
sensitive data, APTs represent efforts by highly-organized and dedicated cybercriminal
groups [14, 21]. Despite the indisputable importance and interesting nature of APTs,
for simplicity’s sake the rest of this chapter focuses on presenting C&C infrastructures
from the botnet’s perspective. However, majority of the discussed principles apply
also for APTs and are actively employed by them.
2.2 Command and Control topologies of botnets
The majority of botnet communication is built on well defined network protocols
and uses existing Internet services, such as the Domain Name System (DNS), to
implement their channels. Having an understanding of the protocols and services
from both the attacker’s and defender’s point of view is key to understanding what
the attackers are capable of doing, and building a strategy to detect and fight C&C
malware. This strategy includes defining taxonimies that classify existing botnets
with the goal of helping defenders to respond to future emerging threats [28, 29]. As
a response to uninterrupted efforts by security professionals to detect and take down
botnets, malware writers experiment with alternative strategies to build more robust
and reliable C&C infrastuctures. [10, 14, 15]
With the shift towards an environment where malware is developed and spread
for financial profit [2, 3], C&C topologies that are cheaper to build and maintain
are favored over topologies that are more robust, but harder to implement. The
earliest and most widely implemented design follows a centralized architecture where
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one or more network nodes function as C&C servers and are used exclusively to
forward messages between bots and a botmaster [25]. When a victim is infected, the
malware will connect to the C&C server to communicate its existence and to retrieve
commands. The C&C servers, also called rendez-vouz points, typically run services
like IRC or HTTP on pre-defined ports and serve incoming connections from the
bots [1]. This client-server architecture provides a simple platform for the malware
to get in contact with C&C servers and to transmit collected information back to the
attacker. Similarly it’s easy for the attacker to deliver new commands to the bots
and to maintain the Command and Control architecture. [15]
An example of the centralized botnet topology is illustrated in Figure 2. Infected
machines, depicted at the bottom of the figure, embed sufficient information about
protocols, message structure and destinations in the malware code to figure out how
to connect to a server in order to establish the C&C channel [30]. To cover their tracks
an attacker can use compromised machines as C&C servers or servers from legitimate
providers that are misused under false identity for malicious purposes. In addition,
the connection between the botmaster and the C&C servers often includes multiple
stepping stones, i.e. intermediary proxy nodes, whose function is to act as gateways
for the communication in order to mask the real location of the botmaster [14]. The
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Figure 3: Push-based Command and Control channel.
use of stepping stones hampers significantly the traceback process to the attacker,
and might require cooperation and legal actions in different countries. [31]
The centralized topology can be further categorized into two subclasses, push
and pull, depending on how a botmaster’s commands reach the bots. In a push style
C&C, illustrated in Figure 3, the bots connect to a C&C server and wait passively
for commands from the botmaster. The botmaster issues new commands on the
C&C server and all bots that are connected to the server receive the commands in
real-time and start executing them. This gives the botmaster real-time control over
the botnet. After the bots have completed the tasks, they report back the result on
the C&C server and wait for new commands. [4, 10, 14, 15]
The classic example of a push style centralized C&C makes use of an IRC server.
IRC is a lightweight text chat protocol that provides chat rooms, or channels, for
group conversations, and private user-to-user chats. Channels are hosted on IRC
servers, which are part of IRC networks. Most channels on IRC networks are publicly
available, but it is possible to require authentication with a password. This provides
lightweight privacy and protection for botnet channels to hide on public IRC servers.
The flexibility of the IRC protocol and the availability of mulitple open-source
implementations provide a simple platform for malware to perform C&C. IRC clients
are typically embedded in the malware code itself and don’t require any pre-installed
programs on the victim machine. [10, 14, 15]
In a pull style C&C, most often implemented through the HTTP protocol, the
botmaster simply connects to a C&C webserver and publishes the commands in a file
that is accessible by the bots. Upon infection, the bots connect to the C&C server
with an Uniform Resource Locator (URL), such as http://hostname/request?id=
[6-byte-bot-id]&country=[2-character-country-code], to retrieve any com-
mands placed passively by the botmaster. The file can be a server-side script that
contains a logic to determine which command, or file, is returned given the characteris-
tics of the connecting bot, e.g. bot identifier or residing country of the victim machine.
An example is demonstrated in Figure 4, where the botmaster places a command
file on the C&C server and a bot later retrieves the file with an HTTP request. In
the pull style approach the botmaster doesn’t have real-time control over the bots,
because there is a delay between the time when the botmaster issues a command
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Figure 4: Pull-based Command and Control channel.
and when the bots check for new commands. The pull style is therefore relatively
loose, i.e. the propagation of commands to the botnet has higher latency. [10, 15]
Centralized topoligies provide a cheap and straightforward C&C architecture for
botnet operators. C&C protocols based on IRC and HTTP are easily customizable to
suit the needs of a particular operation rendering consitent pattern-based detection
difficult. Changes to the botnet structure, such as new C&C servers, are simple to
introduce as the information can be propagated quickly across the botnet. Defender’s
efforts are complicated by these low delay adapting capabilities of centralized botnets.
However, centralized C&C networks are not scalable and controlling hundreds of
thousands of bots requires careful coordination amongst a large number of C&C
servers. Large traffic volumes to central points of the network also induce an increased
risk of detection through traffic monitoring. Centralized C&C servers thus expose
the weakest spot of a botnet and offer few points of failure whose takedown can
effectively destroy a botnet. [10, 14]
To overcome these structural limitations and scalability issues of centralized
architecturess, many malware writers have migrated to distributed and decentralized
designs. Distributed botnet topologies are characterized by the lack of a hierarchical
structure and central servers that would solely provide a channel between the bots
and the botmaster. Instead each node is ranked as hierarchically equal in the
network and can act as both client and server to other nodes. Distributing the C&C
communication over a sufficiently large group of interconnected nodes counters the
issue of scalability as none of the nodes is used as the only gateway for the collectively
generated traffic. [14, 15, 32, 33]
The decentralized design is influenced by various peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing
applications and protocols, such as Napster, Kazaa, Gnutella and Bittorrent. To
illustrate this connection, consider the following example of the Bittorent sharing
network. When a user wishes to download a file from the Bittorrent network, the
Bittorrent client queries a central server for a “torrent” file, i.e. a tracker file that
contains metadata about the searched file. The actual data file is virtually split
into multiple pieces where each piece can be downloaded from several locations on
the network. Based on the metadata stored in the torrent file, a tracking server
coordinates the choice of peers that are involved in sharing pieces of the file and
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Figure 5: Decentralized botnet architecture.
enumerates these peers into a list. The user connects directly to individual peers
from the list and fetches separate pieces until the whole file has been completely
downloaded. While downloading the file, the user node itself is involved in sharing in
that it offers already downloaded pieces to other nodes in the network that are in the
process of downloading the same file. This effectively produces a balanced sharing
network where information is propagated in a distributed manner from peer-to-peer.
The same premise is implemented in decentralized botnets with certain differences.
Instead of a central server that coordinates peers to a given node, each node comes
with a precompiled preliminary list of peers that exists in the malware code at
infection time. For a new node in a bot network, this list provides the first immediate
peers with whose help the node becomes part of the botnet. When a new machine is
infected, the malware engages in information exchange with its immediate peers in
order to update its peer list, and in order for the peers to propagate the existence of
the new node in the network to their respective peers. In this manner new nodes are
quickly integrated to the botnet without requiring a central server. [14, 15, 25]
The decentralized botnet architecture is illustrated in Figure 5. Each of the
bots in the botnet constrain their communication to a limited number of peers.
This is essential for load balancing the traffic between nodes and is implementation
specific to a malware. To map each peer to an approximate number of other peers
and to distribute the load in the network, the information distribution between
two adjacent peers may not be bidiretional. This is denoted in the figure with
directed arrows between infected machines. When the attacker wants to issue a
command to the botnet, it injects the command to a node or a group of nodes. In
push-based propagation the bots receiving the commands inform their peers of the
newly supplied command. By flooding the information to each node’s chosen peers,
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the message is distributed further in the botnet until it has propagated the whole
network. Alternatively in a pull-based propagation method each node queries its
peers periodically for new commands. [14, 15, 33]
Decentralized botnets expose a very small number of crucial weak spots that
might lead back to the attacker. In comparison to the centralized model, where the
C&C servers constitute a definite link between the attacker and the data that is
distributed through them, the decentralized model exposes at minimum only one
entry point from the attacker to the entire bot network. As each of the decentralized
nodes simply relay information that they receive from their peers, the connection
between the distributed data and how the data was acquired are meaningless for
the defenders. This operational model ensures that the trail to the entry point from
an arbitrary observation point is quickly dissipated and nearly impossible to trace
back. Furthermore, as in the case of centralized topologies, the attacker may route
its connection to the entry point through several stepping stones further hampering
the traceback. [14, 15]
The lack of centrally coordinated C&C communication offers a distributed botnet
robustness and greater resilience against disruptions compared to for centralized
networks. Decentralizing the C&C structure, and the associated C&C channels, to a
distributed network removes by definition any focal frailties from the architecture
whose takedown might disrupt the operation of the botnet. Maintaining a list of
peers provides redundancy and strong guarantees of availability for the network. If
for example nodes in the network are taken offline for some reason, such as failures or
seizures, the gaps in the network are closed through intercommunication between bots
and the botnet continues to operate under the control of the attacker. Dismantling a
decentralized bonet can therefore require substantial efforts and disconnecting large
portions of the network. [14, 15, 32]
Although the distributed model offers various design characteristics that are
attractive to malware writers, the popularity and adoption rate of such botnet
architectures has not yet caught up with centralized botnets. This might result from
the difficulty of designing and implementing a protocol that is able to reach necessary
requirements to achieve the properties discussed in this section. The effect is also
largely influenced by the lower implementation cost and simplicity of the centralized
architectures that might provide a greater return of investment on a shorter timescale.
Nevertheless, due to the endless efforts by security professionals to dismantle botnets,
malware writers may migrate increasingly to more resilient botnet topologies.
2.3 Common evasion techniques
The ongoing struggle to cripple and take down rampant botnets has lead to de-
velopments on the malware authors’ side. Due to the inflexibilities in the formal
processes of physically seizing C&C servers and thereby disrupting botnets, security
professionals and researchers have shifted the focus into promoting more secure
practices and developing services that offer privacy and security to their users. In
response and encouraged by the defenders’ efforts to prevent and detect botnet
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communication, C&C designers repeatedly come up with innovative and novel ways
to implement C&C channels. This section presents some techniques and obfuscation
schemes that have been employed by malware authors in their C&C infrastructures
in recent malware.
Compelled by strict security policies that block unused ports and services, many
C&C protocols are tunneled through legitimate services [14]. While enforcing better
practices, these policies have pushed C&C channels to be more frequently routed
through well-known ports, e.g. 25, 80 or 443, effectively bypassing firewall restrictions
and blending C&C communication into benign network traffic [14, 15]. To amplify the
effect and to appear innocent, malware may create legitimate looking fake network
traffic, e.g. by fetching content heavy popular websites, performing search engine
queries or downloading files from image sharing sites. The increased noise in the traffic
in turn slows down manual network traffic analysis by complicating the identification
of the C&C channels.
The Domain Name System is an Internet service that maps easily memorizeable
domain names to unique IP addresses [34]. In addition to benign uses, the DNS
system allows attackers to direct C&C traffic to different destinations just by changing
the underlying IP address of domain, providing flexibility and fault tolerance e.g.
in case a physical server is seized by authorities. The DNS server responsible for a
domain can set a maximum value for the amount of time, called time to live (TTL),
that a returned DNS record can be cached until it must be resolved again. A technique
utilized by attackers, called fast-fluxing, combines unusually short TTL values, often
less than five minutes, with a rotating set of IP addresses that are included in each
DNS record. As a result multiple IP addresses are associated for short periods of
time to a single domain name. In fast-flux networks these IP addresses belong to
compromised hosts that operate as proxy nodes and are configured to relay incoming
traffic to central locations, often called motherships. This process is illustrated in
Figure 6. In the figure, each of the bots on the left side performs a DNS query from
the attacker controlled DNS server for the domain attacker.com and receives a list
of IP addresses. The bots then engage in C&C communication with the proxy nodes
that relay all traffic to a mothership server and to the attacker, who in turn may
respond with instructions over the same channel. [35]
Fast-fluxing is resistant against endpoint takedowns and provides desireable
properties for botnet controllers such as load balancing and protection against
detection. However, security professionals have reacted to fast-flux networks by
targeting its one weakness: the use of a single domain name [1]. Blocking access
to known malicious fast-flux domains is an effective way to cripple C&C channels
that depend on the availability of the domain. Conventions employed to achieve this
include co-operating with domain registrars to suspend domain names, and through
techniques such as blacklisting and domain sinkholing [1]. Domain blacklisting refers
to a practice, where an authority in a network maintains a list of known malicious
domains and compares each outgoing request with the list [14]. If a connection with
a matching domain is found, either an alert is raised or the connection is blocked.
Domain sinkholing on the other hand refers to the combined efforts of security
professionals and DNS server authorities in which a malicious domain is shut out
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Figure 6: Fast-flux network.
from all external access. This is achieved by reconfiguring the DNS server that is
responsible for resolving addresses of the domain under which malicious domain
names have been registered, and instructing it to hand out safe IP addresses.
In response to these simple and responsive techniques to inhibit C&C commu-
nication to malware author’s domains, C&Cs designers have introduced new styles
to exploit features of the DNS system. This has taken its form in algorithms that
dynamically derive rendez-vous points, which is most often achieved using domain
generation algorithms (DGA). A DGA is an algorithm that takes a random seed
as input and computes a list of domain names that can potentially lead to active
C&C servers. DGAs are run periodically, e.g. once a day, using a seed that can be
based on details such as the current date or time, word lists, Twitter trends or even
foreign exchange rates [36]. The output of the seeded DGA algorithm is a list of
domain names that form a set of potential C&C destinations. In order to connect
with malware bots, the attacker uses the same seed to produce an equivalent list
and registers one or more of these domains in order to set up rendez-vous points
for the bots. If part of the domains or IP addresses get identified and taken down
by defenders, the bots will keep resolving domain names until a domain succesfully
resolves to a relocated C&C server. DGAs thus offer an agile strategy to provide
redundancy against DNS-based defense techniques and to complicate C&C channel
takedowns. [1, 14, 30]
In addition to escaping takedowns, malware authors seek to conceal the data being
transmitted over C&C channels. Steganography is a practice of hiding a message in
plain sight in such a way that it doesn’t raise suspicions in onlookers or untrained
eyes. Steganography provides an unobservable communication channel that can be
employed using legitimate content, e.g. by encoding the messages inside redundant
bits in image files. A real example of this is given in Figure 7, which portrays an
image file that was downloaded by a malware over a C&C channel. When viewing
the image in a usual way, it would display an animated running character. However,
the image conceals a malware component that is only extractable by the malware
author and the recipient, which in this case was a bot. This way malware can take
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Figure 7: Hidden executable inside an image file.
advantage of the unobservability brought by steganographic means to perform hidden
C&C communication. [14]
In order to evade pattern-based detection mechanisms, malware authors have
increasingly employed even simpler techniques to ensure both unobservability and
message concealment. Data obfuscation, e.g. through encoding or encryption, aims to
remove cleartext information and invariants from the transmitted messages. Recently
C&C designers have started implementing C&C protocols directly on top of lower-
level carrier protocols, i.e. TCP and UDP. By encrypting, or otherwise obfuscating
the payload, deriving the underlying plaintext is hard and at best impossible without
knowing the encryption key or algorithm used for the obfuscation. If in addition the
encryption key is secret and not easily retrievable, these C&C protocols effectively
evade most conventional pattern-based detection systems. [12, 14]
2.4 Previous work on Command and Control detection
The problem of malware Command and Control communication and the associated
practices of performing network-level detection are by no means new fields of research.
A wide range of approaches have been studied and multiple different systems have
been proposed. These continuous efforts are encouraged by the fact that C&C
channels are often the weakest link in the operation of advanced malware. From the
defender’s point of view, C&C channels thus offer a suitable target and opportunity
to effectively disrupt the functions of the complete malware C&C infrastructures.
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This section presents previous research efforts that have been done to achieve this.
In particular, proposed detection systems, which target C&C channels and thereby
introduce relevance to the context of this thesis, are focused on.
Being the most commonly utilized way of performing C&C communication,
centralized C&C infrastructures that are implemented with HTTP or IRC as carrier
protocols are a self-explanatory target of detection efforts. Motivated by a need of
good quality inputs for algorithms that automatically generate network signatures,
Perdisci et al. [19] propose a system that is capable of identifying similarities in
malware network communication. The analysis phase of the system tracks the way
in which a malicious program interacts with the Internet and identifies distinct
structural characteristics in the malware’s network traffic. Similarities between
samples are exposed by performing hierarchical clustering on the sequences of HTTP
requests, which then serve as input to an algorithm that extracts network behaviour
models for each cluster. These behaviour models represent the similarty between
the samples in the cluster and describe the identifying features of C&C traffic. The
models are entered into a network signature generation algorithm that produces
Snort intrusion detection system (IDS) rules. Furthermore the generated network
signatures are deployed in a real-world proof of concept experiment that verifies the
overall feasibility of the detection system.
Similar approaches to this include efforts by Gu et al. [37] in BotHunter, which is
a passive perimeter monitoring and bot detection system that relies on a pre-defined
general infection model for botnets. Specific hosts that belong to a botnet are
detected by performing dialog correlation between alerts raised by anomaly-based
intrusion detection and the defined model. BotHunter is capable of detecting infected
hosts regardless of an underlying C&C infrastructure or network protocol, given that
the traffic generated by the bot strictly follows the user-defined infection model. Bot-
Sniffer [10], by Gu et al., on the other hand moves away from vertical correlation, i.e.
host specific detection, and instead targets centralized botnet architectures through
horizontal correlation. BotSniffer scans network traffic for behaviour that triggers
anomaly-based signatures. Hosts in the monitored network that produce anomalous
traffic are grouped by their network destination attributes, namely destination IP
address and port. Hosts in these groups are then analysed for spatial-temporal
correlation and similarity in order to verify features that are typical to centralized
botnet architectures.
To overcome the limitations of being constrained to specific features in botnet
C&C protocols and structures, Gu et al. have also proposed BotMiner [38]. BotMiner
takes a similar approach as BotSniffer in that clients in the monitored network are
clustered based on their traffic destination attributes, but also source attributes.
This clustering happens on the so called C-plane, i.e. scope where the information
about who is communicating with whom is determined. This clustering is, however,
performed in general on the network traffic and doesn’t imply maliciousness of a host
by itself. In order to gain insight about malicious activities, BotMiner also operates
on the A-plane, i.e. activity plane, where malicious activities in the traffic, e.g.
spam, network scanning or binary downloads, are identified and used as a basis for
further clustering. The information from these planes is combined using cross-plane
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correlation, which produces indications whether a given host is likely to be part of a
botnet. In this manner the detection system is not constrained to only C&C channels
that show distinct features, but targets in general the inherent malicious features of
botnet C&C communication.
All of the approaches presented above address threats that employ cleartext
protocols in their C&C communication. Necessitated by the observed increase in
obscured C&C protocols, research efforts that target encrypted C&C channels are
a crucial requirement in order to detect prevalent new threats. ProVeX [12], by
Rossow et al., is an approach that aims at detecting encrypted C&C traffic that
is implemented on top of non-descriptive carrier protocols and thus doesn’t expose
any characteristic invariants in the traffic. The approach taken by ProVeX relies on
the decryption of network traffic and n-gram-based malware classification. The a
priori knowledge of the decryption routines and the capability to decrypt network
traffic is obtained through reverse engineering the encryption algorithms of several
recent malware. The decrypted plaintext C&C communication is then used to build
probabilistic n-gram-based models for each malware. For this, byte positions in C&C
messages are correlated over the communication of a malware family. The obtained
probabilistic models are finally applied and matched on traffic that is being decrypted
with all decryption routines on a network traffic sensor. ProVeX demonstrates that a
decryption-based intrusion detection system is a feasible approach even on high-speed
links, but acknowledges at the same time critical short comings, e.g. unlikelyhood of
good scalability and the reliance on static encryption routines in malware.
Another approach against encrypted C&C traffic is CoCoSpot proposed by Dietrich
et al. [39]. Unlike with ProVeX, CoCoSpot doesn’t require a priori knowledge about
the underlying plaintext message of the C&C communication or the associated C&C
infrastructure. It’s main contribution is a system that is capable of recognizing C&C
channels based on known malicious communication behaviour. The recognition of
these channels is based on the traffic analysis properties of transmitted messages that
infer details about the structure of the C&C protocol. These properties are defined
to comprise individual message lengths carried in HTTP, TCP, or UDP packets,
and sequences of such message lengths. To train their traffic classifier, Dietrich
et al. utilize a large set of malware generated network traffic that are obtained
through malware executions in a controlled environment. The classifier is further
supplied threat information through verified label information provided by an AV
vendor. CoCoSpot argues that the classifier is capable of recognizing malicious C&C
channels of a variety of recent botnets, and to attribute a threat for the observed
traffic behaviour.
DISCLOSURE by Bilge et al. [40] takes this a step further by presenting a large-
scale botnet detection system that doesn’t require the transmitted payloads at all in
detection the process. Instead, DISCLOSURE performs detection on C&C servers
through NetFlow analysis that leverages patterns and flow characteristics that are
typical to bots. In particular, the presented system extracts side-channel information
regarding flow sizes, temporal behaviour and client-access patterns, and derives
detection models that describe bot behaviour towards a C&C server. Bilge et al.
utilize random forest classifiers to train their classifier and utilize ground truth labels
18
obtained from a third party threat intelligence company. The challenge that was
faced when building DISCLOSURE was the false positive (FP) ratio that was induced
by the derived criteria when matching on immensely large data sets. To reduce their
FP ratio, Bilge et al. incorporated combined reputation score information from three
external sources, including Google Safe Browsing, to facilitate the system’s decisions
on detections. The established DISCLOSURE system was, according to the authors,
able to perform real-time detection of C&C servers with a false positive rate of 1 %.
2.5 Summary
Advanced malware that employ C&C infrastructures have become a large and
prevalent threat on the Internet. Due to the large attack surface caused by a number
of vulnerabilities in common software, ending up as a victim of a malware infection
is a common peril. Efforts by security professionals have driven C&C designers to
evolve and come up with novel and innovative ways to evade detection and thwart
takedown attempts. Combined with the recent increase in encrypted communication,
these sophisticated and persistent threats put the information security industry up for
a real challenge. Thanks to the active field of study, new approaches are constantly
tested and proposed. Thus, through combined efforts, smarter detection systems
and developing better practices, these threats can be defended against. In the next
chapter, the concept and underlying methodologies of a new analysis and detection
system are proposed.
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3 Context and methodolgies
In this chapter a concept is proposed that enables the detection of encrypted Command
and Control channels. Specifically, encrypted C&C channels that are implemented
on top of non-descriptive carrier protocols are targeted, as such communication
often evades conventional signature-based network detection methods. The system
leverages exposed side-channel information of C&C communication and produces
signatures that constitute a new technique, called network fingerprints. These
network fingerprint signatures are designed to be deployed on network-based intrusion
detection systems monitoring the traffic at the edge between two networks. The
presented system comprises multiple phases that are described in the following section
and later in more detail in Chapter 4. The first section presents the motivation for
the work by providing a description of the issues with existing detection systems
with regards to encrypted C&C communication. The section proceeds to explain
the scope of the work and lays the theoretical foundations for network fingerprints.
The second section provides an overview of the architectural context in which this
work is realized and introduces the components of the final analysis system that
is established in this research. The third section states the main objectives of the
work and clarifies the subgoals that are necessitated by the result. The last section
provides a short summary of the whole chapter.
3.1 Problem statement and conceptual overview
A general approach to detect malware C&C channels are network-based intrusion
detection systems. These systems commonly perform detection that is based on
network signatures. Network signatures are a general name for a set of definitions,
which dictate the means of how malicious network traffic is detected on a network
and how detection events are handled. Commonly used IDS systems, such as Snort1
and Suricata2, provide flexible signature languages that enable precise ways to set
these definitions. Traffic detection is usually realized in the form of boundaries and
content conditions that, when fulfilled, trigger a detection event. Content matching is
performed on the traffic through pattern matching methods, such as applying regular
expressions. In the case of triggered detection events, special rules define matters
such as how and when the IDS, and in the end an administrator of the IDS, should
be notified about the events. These rules can include details such as thresholds, alert
limits, time intervals and signature chaining, and also the output channel, e.g. logs.
Network signatures are generated by automated systems or through manual
analysis, and target features in the C&C communication that are characteristic
to a malware. These features are often found either in the details of the carrier
protocol or in the carrier protocol’s payload, or both. The carrier protocol is the
1https://www.snort.org/
2http://suricata-ids.org/
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Figure 8: Descriptive carrier protocols exhibit tags and spatial delimiters.
underlying protocol that is used as a platform to transmit the actual C&C protocol.
This can be an application-layer protocol, e.g. HTTP or IRC, or alternatively if not
present, the transport-layer protocol, e.g. TCP or UDP, that is used to carry the
application-layer C&C protocol. Most systems that perform network-based detection
on C&C communication, including the ones presented in Section 2.4, require at least
some a priori knowledge of the cleartext C&C communication. Cleartext in this
context is used to denote communication that directly exposes structural patterns
of the carrier protocol or the carried C&C protocol itself. Cleartext can therefore
include artifacts, such as human-readable plaintext strings or spatial structures that
encompass information, which can be useful for the C&C protocol parsers used by
the bot and the botmaster.
The a priori knowledge of the internals of a C&C protocol present a significant
advantage to detection systems. Protocols in general define the conventions and
procedures that two parties can employ in order to exchange messages in a fashion
that both parties understand the communication. This definition implies that
the protocol includes defined invariants that are used to tag or delimit parts of
the protocol messages. The existence of such static tags or spatial patterns can
be therefore leveraged in detecting the protocols existence in the communication
without the requirement of knowing the carried message. This principle is what most
conventional signature-based network detection systems utilize in order to detect
malware communication. These protocol invariants can be obtained directly from
the messages if the traffic generated by a malware is not obfuscated. If the messages
are encrypted or otherwise obscured, the invariants can be derived dynamically by
e.g. decrypting the messages upon receiving, as was done by Rossow et al. in [12].
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Figure 9: Encrypted payloads on non-descriptive carrier protocols don’t exhibit any
useful invariants.
Most current malware utilize carrier protocols that expose invariants to the C&C
communication. Common application-layer protocols, e.g. HTTP and IRC, exhibit
characteristic strings in their protocol headers regardless of the purpose of use and
can be used as a basis for detection. In the context of this work, carrier protocols
that demonstrate this feature are called descriptive protocols. An example of this is
shown in Figure 8, where a C&C protocol transmits a seemingly obfuscated payload
inside an HTTP protocol packet. The descriptive carrier protocol incorporates
multiple characteristic delimiters and tags that can theoretically be used as a basis
for identification. Perdisci et al. have shown that the identification of such invariants
in malware generated HTTP traffic can be automatized and used in the generation
of IDS signatures [19]. However, many prevalent C&C malware implement their
C&C protocol on top of lower-layer carrier protocols, such as TCP or UDP. These
protocols don’t exhibit useful carrier protocol-specific characteristics for signature-
based detection and are therefore called non-descriptive protocols. Due to the lack
of useful headers, tags or delimiters in the carrier protocol, invariant-based detection
is possible only if the C&C protocol is in cleartext or encrypted with a known, or
easily deriveable, static key. [12]
Recent developments suggest that malware authors have increasingly started to
employ encrypted Command and Control channels on top of non-descriptive carrier
prototcols. C&C designers are thus shifting towards techniques that don’t expose
any valuable cleartext artifacts and effectively evade most existing detection systems.
This is illustrated in Figure 9, where a non-descriptive carrier protocol is used to
deliver an encrypted message in the payload, which conceals the cleartext C&C
protocol message. While it is possible to obtain necessary information of a C&C
protocol’s invariants through reverse engineering malware samples, detecting these
C&C protocols through traffic decryption in IDS systems doesn’t provide a scalable
solution. New systems are therefore required to supplement current invariant-based
detection systems in order to maintain coverage of evasive emerging threats. [12]
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This master’s thesis presents a novel technique for the detection of encrypted
malware C&C channels. The presented technique, called network fingerprints, specif-
ically targets C&C channels that are instrumented to use non-descriptive carrier
protocols and thereby would evade conventional network-based detection systems, as
previously described. Along with the technique itself, a full-fledged analysis architec-
ture is developed on the side, which performs automatized analysis and clustering on
captured malware network traffic, and supports the generation of network fingerprint
signatures for an intrusion detection system. The internals of this architecture are
explained more in depth in Section 3.2 and Chapter 4.
Network fingerprints are a special type of network signatures that leverage side-
channel vulnerabilities in C&C communication. Side-channel vulnerabilities in this
context denote sources of information that may provide an eavesdropper who has
access to the messages any insights about the content of the exchanged traffic. The
term is often employed in conjunction with encrypted communication as cleartext
traffic already exhibits exploitable characteristics by default. These side-channel
leaks can be a cause of weak implementations or incorrect use of cryptographic algo-
rithms, and can reveal useful information through the statefulness of an application,
temporally aligned communication patterns, or packet characteristics, such as packet
sizes and payload entropy. By observing vulnerable traffic that exhibits side-channel
leaks, the observer can search for correlating features in a sufficiently large dataset
and create accurate fingerprints of the incorporated interrelationships in order to
later identify similar traffic. Identifying and leveraging side-channel leaks in C&C
protocols thus enables an effective way of detecting encrypted C&C channels. [41]
One important requirement for the presented network fingerprint solution is the
ability to perform reliable C&C channel detection on high-speed network links without
introducing performance and packet loss to the underlying intrusion detection system.
In order to achieve high scalability, constraints have to be set on the number and
type of side-channel features that are targeted in the design of the new detection
capability. A significant aspect of scalability in an intrusion detection system is its
memory efficiency. Memory problems can be reduced for example by implementing
features that don’t depend on complex state computations, i.e. storing and operating
on states, or require only a small state buffer. In order to meet these requirements,
the dimensions of the targeted side-channel vulnerabilities have to be limited to a
level that is still able to ensure a high detection reliability against encrypted C&C
channels. Due to their straightforward measureability and computability, this work
focuses on two side-channel leaks: payload size and payload entropy.
Payload sizes and entropy expose revealing information about a packet and
the malware that participates in its transmission. Similarly to benign network
protocols, C&C protocols often include authentication routines in the beginning
of the C&C interaction where the C&C server verifies the authenticity of the bot
before relaying further information, e.g. commands. This kind of C&C protocol
behaviour suggests that there exist certain message sequences that conform more
often to a usual pattern than others. Tracking the payload sizes of potentially
reoccurring message sequences provides a simple and straightforward solution for
identifying patterns in malicious C&C channels. Furhtermore, as mentioned earlier,
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unencrypted cleartext C&C messages often exhibit invariants to the communication,
such as tags or delimiters. The existence of these invariants affects the entropy of a
message that is encrypted and thereby exposes information about the contents of
the message itself. Extracting payload entropy information and associating it with
payload size sequences enables a reliable way of deriving fingerprints of C&C protocol
communication. This combination thus offers a simple and lightweight approach for
the detection.
The combination of payload sizes and entropies in association to a message
sequence allows to express network fingerprints in a clear vectorized form:
netfp = 〈(lc1, ec1), . . . , (lcn, ecn), (ls1, es1), . . . , (lsn, esn)〉,
where l refers to the payload size (or length) of a captured packet and e is the
Shannon entropy of the packet payload. The individual tuples, consisting of the
packet size and entropy, are dependent on the index of a packet inside a traffic
flow. The index n of a tuple is the upper bound limit for which matching is
attempted. Furthermore the directionality of the network traffic is taken into account
by distinguishing between source and destination originated packets, denoted in the
model by c, for client, and s, for server.
Network fingerprints operate in the context of network traffic flows [42], which
are defined to be comprised of single TCP connections from a source IP address
and port, the client, to a destination IP address and port, the server. A traffic flow
is further divided into transactions, i.e. single messages sent by the source host
or the destination host, which are carried over the network inside TCP segments.
For simplicitys sake, the terms packet and segment are used to describe the same
concept in this thesis and are used interchangeably. An individual transaction in a
traffic flow is described in the network fingerprint by a single tuple. This connection
is made by marking the tuples with the index of the targeted transaction in the
flow. The values of a tuple at index i thus define the conditions that have to be
met by the transaction payload i in order for the tuple to match. A tuple may
consist of both entropy and payload size constraints or alternatively only one, which
for example enables matching on only short packets, where the Shannon entropy
provides an unreliable value due to undersampling [43]. Network fingerprints can also
be a combination of tuples that target both client and server transactions, or only
one of them. Furthermore, the indexing of the tuples is flexible, i.e. the transaction
index between two tuples must not necessarily be sequentially incremental, allowing
a network fingerprint to have “gaps”. This is useful for example in a case where the
state machine of a C&C protocol is known. Using specific indexes in the fingerprint
would then allow to target specific states in the execution of the C&C protocol.
The flexible structure of network fingerprints provides adaptibility to side-channel
detection of C&C communication. After generating a network fingerprint signature,
the fingerprint is placed on a network IDS, which attempts to match the fingerprint
on monitored traffic flows. A detection event for a flow is defined to occur, when all
tuples of a network fingerprint match on their respective transactions in the flow.
Therefore the reliability of an individual network fingerprint is directly proportional
to the quantity and quality of the constraints in the fingerprint. In the general
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context of network intrusion detection the reliability of a network signature is directly
linked to the degree with which it generates false positive detections when exposed
to benign network traffic. Due to the difficulty of modeling C&C communication in
a generic way with respect to benign network traffic, deriving a theoretical model
for the criteria of a good network fingerprint is difficult. For this reason the set of
requirements that define a reliable network fingerprint are determined experimentally
in Chapter 5.
Network fingerprints enable a broadened detection capability of a wide range of
C&C malware. Unlike many existing research approaches that target a particular
malware C&C infrastructure, e.g. centralized or distributed/P2P, network fingerprints
are not constrained to be effective only against specific C&C types. In addition,
based on the eliminated requirement of posessing a priori knowledge of the cleartext
C&C protocol, network fingerprints can be theoretically used against any C&C
communication that exposes payload size and entropy side-channel leaks. As a result
the variety of malware that fall inside the limits of this detection approach include
next to botnets also other prevalent threats, e.g. ransomware and APTs.
The detection capability for a malware can, however, only be created if the
malware exhibits sufficient intrinsic similarities between its samples. This statement
creates an integral assumption that malware samples of a single variant, which
belong to the same malware family, behave deterministically and conform to the
same commands and communication patterns, i.e. cleartext C&C protocol. Thus
observing similarities in sufficient quantity should enable the detection of patterns
through artifacts that are derived from the observed similarities in the C&C behaviour.
This means that while the knowledge of the details of the cleartext C&C protocol are
not necessary for the proposed detection system, the assumption is made that such a
protocol indeed exists and is uniform for a single malware variant. This assumption
is an implied general precondition for all network-based intrusion detection systems
that rely on network signatures, as detection would otherwise not exist. Other types
of detection approaches, e.g. anomaly-based systems, can nevertheless still be applied.
Therefore the scope of the detection capability presented in this master’s thesis covers
malware for which the use of a shared cleartext C&C protocol is reflected in the form
of side-channel information leaks in the network traffic.
The confined scope and novel approach of the research presented in this thesis
constitute the complementary contribution to the state of the art. Malware C&C
channels in general have been the subject of extensive research efforts and have
resulted in a variety of proposed detection systems. A large part of these approaches
focus on C&C infrastructures that communicate over plaintext protocols or expose
other exploitable invariant characteristics in the C&C communication. In order
to minimize the overlap in the subject with other existing work, further technical
boundaries are defined that clearly state the focused nature of this research. In
particular, detection efforts are directed at C&C channels that (i) utilize TCP as
C&C carrier protocol; and (ii) utilize custom encryption as means to obscure the
cleartext C&C communication. Custom encryption refers to encryption routines that
don’t exhibit an identifyable fingerprint in the carried application-layer protocol, e.g.
as is the case for transport layer security (TLS). The belief of the author is that
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confining the conceptual scope and introducing well defined technical boundaries to
the system allows the creation of a specific and advanced detection.
A similar scope has been explored by Rossow et al. in ProVeX [12]. The approach
taken by the authors relies on probabilistic vectorized signatures that are derived
from decrypted C&C traffic by evaluating byte probabilities at different positions in
messages. Subsequent C&C detection is performed by actively decrypting network
traffic and identifying characteristic byte values at specific offsets in the decrypted
messages. ProVeX was able to obtain promising results in a live test, where the
established IDS system was deployed on a small university network for 24 hours.
Due to the limited extent of the test, both in size and duration, it is reasonable to
question the scalability of the system. As opposed to ProVeX, the solution presented
in this work is applied to actual enterprise environments for extended periods of time
and thereby tested for performance, scalability and detection accuracy. The achieved
applicability on large-scale enterprise environments therefore sets this research apart
from related works, and can as a result be considered a complementary contribution
to the state of the art.
3.2 Context and architecture
This section presents the unique context in which the research is realized. This
context is comprised of an existing malware analysis platform by Lastline Inc.3 and
the analysis systems utilized by the network analysts in the company. The new
detection capability that is acquired as a result of this research adds to the already
existing capabilities of the platform, supplements the network analysis framework
and improves the detection coverage of the IDS solution. The architectural context is
presented in the form of a pipeline in Figure 10. The significance of the steps in the
pipeline is explained below by outlining the functions of each phase and describing
the intermediate products transferred between the stages. This section provides an
overview of the process of generating network fingerprints, which is further described
in detail in Chapter 4, where the focus is set on the implementational specifics of
the network analysis system.
As mentioned in the previous section, an essential requirement for signature-based
intrusion detection systems is the availability of sufficient material, i.e. malware
network traffic, for the analysis. In typical research projects this is accomplished
by utilizing existing archives of recorded network traffic, and establishing detection
against malicious traffic that is blended among a large set of benign traffic in the
archives. Another approach to obtain malicious network traffic is to execute malware
in a contained execution environment and to record the network traffic generated by
the malware within a virtual network. These contained execution environments, often
referred to as sandboxes, are automated systems for dynamic malware analysis that
are utilized to examine and understand the behaviour of unknown malware samples
by executing them [44, 45]. These systems have been studied extensively and their
detailed functions are out of the scope of this work. However, the presented research
3https://www.lastline.com/
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Figure 10: Target analysis pipeline.
utilizes the sandbox provided by the aforementioned malware analysis platform and
therefore the general benefits and products of a sandbox require further explanation.
An additional requirement for research projects that utilize sandboxes for gener-
ating malicious network traffic are the actual malware samples that are executed and
analysed in the contained environment. This malware can be for example collected
from existing archives or from public sources, such as VirusTotal 4. In the context of
this thesis, input to the sandbox is generated by extracting transmitted files from
real-world production environment networks. Files are extracted by the underlying
intrusion detection system, which is positioned at the edge of these networks and
monitors the passing traffic. This extraction can be performed on a multitude of
different protocols, such as HTTP, FTP, SMB and SMTP. The range of supported
protocols in conjunction with a wide adoption of the malware analysis platform offer
a substantial stream of input data to the sandbox execution environment. This
stream can be further supplemented through manual submission of malware samples.
Files that are extracted or submitted manually to the sandbox environment are
placed in a queue to go through a thorough dynamic analysis process.
The goal of running a malicious sample in a sandbox is to gather insights of
the malware malicious intent on a victim machine. A malware might attempt to
evade dynamic analysis by implementing evasion tricks that detect the presence of
4https://www.virustotal.com/
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a debugger or virtualised environment, and sidetrack the malware execution to a
branch that displays benign behaviour. However, performing run-time analysis on
the sample with an emulated processor allows a debugger to monitor each instruction
the malware executes and to detect code branches in order to divert the execution.
This enables to circumvent some evasions and to expose the concealed malicious
behaviour, e.g. C&C network activity. Using emulation or virtualisation to simulate
a hospitable environment for a malware to run enables the parallelization of sandbox
systems. The benefit of this feature is the immense scalability increase that simulated
environments provide compared to pure hardware-based dynamic analysis systems.
In addition sandboxes can be easily reset to their original state after a malware
execution has ended in order to prepare the environment for a new malware analysis.
Sandbox analysis provides therefore a scalable and fast way of collecting malicious
network traffic for further analysis. This network traffic, in the form of packet
captures (PCAP, or pcap), serves as the input to the next high-level stage in the
analysis pipeline, the network analysis system, which is displayed in Figure 10 after
the sandbox. The streamlined process, where files are extracted from the wire and
immediately analysed, offers the advantage of a continuous stream of “fresh” data
to the network analysis system. The captured malware samples and their network
traffic thus represent a snapshot of the present state of malware in "the wild" and
provide a good overview of prevalent threats and ongoing infection campaigns. The
C&C traffic in the network analysis system therefore allows for a quick response
against new and uncovered malware within a minimal time window.
The network analysis system comprises the core functionalities that form the
basis for the developed detection capability of encrypted C&C channels. These
functionalities are divided into successive substages where each incorporates actions
that analyse and transform the input produced in the previous substage. The initial
input to the analysis system consists of the raw network traffic captured by the
sandbox environment, and its metadata. The metadata is generated by several
application program interface (API) functions that parse the traffic captures and
provide flow specific information, such as DNS name, carrier protocol, and source
and destination IP addresses. The combined information is stored on the network
analysis system in a relational database that allows for efficient data loading.
In order to conform to the technical scope defined in the previous section, network
traffic that meets the defined requirements is separated in a preparatory filtering
stage. This filtering is carried out by utilizing special protocol matchers on the
captured network traffic. The protocol matchers are a set of predefined conditions
that are checked for each flow in a given traffic capture. These conditions define
rules about the structure and form that must be fulfilled by a flow in order to be
tagged as belonging to a certain protocol. Thus, in order to comply with the strict
scope of this research, all flows that match an application layer protocol matcher’s
definitions are excluded from the analysis. As a result, all TCP flows that are not
matched in the filtering process are included in the analysis dataset. The filtered
dataset is then passed on to the next stage.
The second stage in the network analysis system, denoted as the clustering phase,
forms the most important stage in the generation of network fingerprint signatures.
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The goal of this stage is to detect meaningful correlations in the filtered TCP flows
and to group intercorrelating flows. This is achieved by clustering the flows and
using the individual payload sizes of the captured outgoing requests as the basis
for clustering. The clustering stage is the part in the pipeline where the sufficiency
of available malware traffic plays a significant role. For clustering algorithms in
general, larger clusters indicate either that the boundaries defined for the algorithm
are too broad, or that the data in the cluster show good similarity and are highly
intercorrelated. Discovering well intercorrelating clusters thus becomes more difficult
if the initial data is sparse and doesn’t contain a large enough quantity of network
traffic generated by an individual malware variant that would represent the malware
sufficiently. Hence the importance of a scalable system that produces input data to
the network analysis system can’t be overstated.
The cluster information is relayed further to the signature generation phase. This
phase represents the stage in the pipeline where correlations in the network traffic
are expressed with a rule language that describes the nature of the correlation in a
well defined manner through signatures. The product of the stage are preliminary
network signatures that represent network fingerprints. In addition to the TCP
payload size information, the signature generation also leverages the side-channel
entropy information exposed in the payloads. Even though the entropy information
is not included as input to the clustering phase, it is important for improving the
precision of network fingerprints. Additional constraints in the signatures lessen
the risk of random accidental matches on benign traffic and, if the validity of these
constraints is carefully verified, only affect positively the probability of matching
on malicous traffic. In conjunction with derived entropy information, the signature
generation phase translates the correlation of the payload sizes into a human-readable
rule language, which is described in more detail in Chapter 4.
The generated signatures undergo next a manual inspection phase, where the
signatures are verified by human network analysts and refined to higher quality.
The signatures are then input to a conversion system that transforms them into
components of the matching framework that is supported by the employed intrusion
detection system. The existing malware analysis platform employs the Suricata
intrusion detection system for tapping into passing traffic. Instances of the Suricata
IDS are run on physical platforms, called network sensors, that are distributed and
embedded at the edge of the networks of customers that piggyback on the malware
analysis platform to detect threats that possibly infect their computer systems.
Network signatures that are deployed on sensors are also called network detectors.
The Suricata rule matching framework applies the converted network fingerprint
detectors to each passing flow that matches the initial requirements of the assumed
malicious traffic, and thereby attempts to detect encrypted C&C channels. In a
case where the packet payload size and entropy constraints for a defined network
fingerprint are found to match a passing flow, the flow data is recorded and transferred
along with the detector information to an event analysis system for inspection and
verification.
A significant feature in the malware analysis platform is the possibility to deploy
network signatures in two different detector modes, candidate and real. The difference
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between the modes is that real mode detectors are forwarded, in addition to the event
analysis system, also to a production environment that allows customers to view
the events. The benefit of containing candidate mode events in the internal analysis
system is the addition of an adjunct verification layer. Events raised by candidate
mode detectors are reviewed by network analysts who produce decisions on their
validity and verify the quality of the underlying signature. This concept is an integral
part of the analysis pipeline in that it offers valuable insights about the behaviour of
signatures when they are exposed to large volumes of beningn network traffic. This
feature in the platform allows wide scale testing of network signatures before they are
deployed in real mode to the sensors and raise visible alerts to customers. Detectors
can go through a loop where the underlying signature is edited and verified multiple
times before it is deemed to be high-quality. A detector that proves to be efficient
performance-wise and quality-wise can then be promoted into a real mode detector.
3.3 Objectives and verification
The main objective of this research work is to establish a proof of concept for the
network-based detection capability for encrypted C&C channels. The detection
capability is to be free of assumptions about, and unconstrained by, any possible
underlying C&C infrastructure that enables the communication of malware, such as
centralized or decentralized designs. The established detection capability must also
be able to remain performant on IDS systems that tap onto heavily loaded network
links that transfer data with speeds up to 1 Gbps. In addition the performance,
measured in packet loss (%) and processing load, must remain within reasonable
boundaries with respect to the added benefits of new detections. These boundaries are
determined in the experimental stage of the research when the qualitative attributes
of the detection become more apparent.
From the state of the art’s point of view, the goal is to produce a novel way of
perfoming C&C channel detection with network fingerprints. This goal is evaluated
through a review process on the generated events in the event analysis system. The
qualitative success and reliability of the network fingerprints can be measured e.g. as
the ratio of generated true positive (TP) events with respect to generated false positive
events. This approach, however, can not be viewed as an exclusive measure due to
the analysis loop enabled by the event analysis system, which allows a continuous
improvement and verification process of non-performant network fingerprints. Thus
the success of network fingerprints could be also expressed in a quantitative manner,
e.g. as number of events that would go otherwise undetected. However, due to the
use of real-world networks as a testing environment the tracking of missed detection
events, i.e. false negatives (FN), is not possible in the context of this thesis.
These main objectives necessitate the accomplishment of several subgoals. Net-
work fingerprints are enabled by the analysis framework and the signature generation
process. The establishment of the detection capability requires constructing new
components that provide the necessary tools for analysing incoming traffic and
extracting interesting features from flows that meet the criteria of the research.
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These components must be compatible with existing network analysis systems and
allow the creation, verification and deployment of network fingerprints in an efficient
and reliable manner. These subgoals can only be verified in a subjective manner
as quantifying the usefulness of an analysis system that is dependent on human
involvement is difficult.
3.4 Summary
Command and Control traffic has become more complex and increasingly non-trivial to
detect. The current state of the art focuses on invariant-based detection mechanisms
that are thwarted by encrypted C&C channels. When implemented on top of non-
descriptive carrier protocols, these C&C channels don’t exhibit any invarints to be
used as basis for conventional pattern-based detection. With changing encryption
keys these channels implement a type of polymorphism in their communication, as
each channel conveys dissimilar messages, thus erasing any payload intercorrelation
of two separate malware instances. These C&C channels can, however, be targeted
assuming that the communication exposes side-channel vulnerabilities. This thesis
exploits this idea and introduces a new detection technique, network fingerprints,
that takes advantage of side-channel leaks in order to extract fingerint signatures
that accurately identify encrypted C&C channels. These network fingerprints target
reoccurring C&C protocol characteristics of malware and leverage the payload size
and entropy information of captured packet sequences for detection. This detection
capability is enabled through supplementing an existing network analysis framework
with additional components that are responsible for the analysis of the traffic data
and signature generation. These network fingerprints are then deployed to real-world
production environment networks where they are exposed to large volumes of benign
traffic. The performance of the detection capability is evaluated quantitatively and
qualitatively by inspecting performance metrics on network sensors and by deriving
information about true positive and false positive events.
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4 Experimental setup
This chapter presents the individual phases that are constructed or supplemented to
the network analysis infrastructure in order to establish a proof of concept system
for the network fingerprint-based detection. The chapter clarifies and explains design
choices and technical details about the implementation of the separate components.
The first section describes the process in which the non-descriptive TCP network
traffic is filtered from the large stream of traffic captures provided by the sandbox
analysis system. The filtered traffic is input to the clustering phase, which groups
intercorrelating C&C flows in preparation for the signature generation phase. This is
described in the second section. The third section presents the heuristic method that
extracts entropy information from the generated clusters and feeds the combined
information to an automatic signature generation algorithm. The results of the
signature generation phase are visualized graphically in the next phase, which is
described in the fourth section. In this phase the signatures are verified and refined
by network analysts to obtain the most accurate and descriptive network signatures.
The fifth section explains the structure and components of the final form of network
fingerprints and how traffic matching is performed in an IDS system. The last section
provides a short summary of the whole chapter.
4.1 Protocol filtering
Network traffic captured in the sandbox system has to be filtered before analysis can
be applied to the traffic data. The introduced scope of this research states that the
focus is set only on bare TCP traffic and thus all application-layer protocols, and
other transport-layer protocols, are by definition not part of the research topic. The
protocol filtering is done to assure an accurate and performant outcome for the new
detection technique rather than providing an all-round solution that is not capable
of performing precise detection. Restricting the set of targeted network traffic allows
the analysis to focus on specific features of the exchanged packets and to extract
accurate fingerprints to describe the C&C communication.
Protocol filtering is done by comparing a wide range of known protocol imple-
mentations to the data transmitted in a network flow. A common property of
application-layer protocols is that they conform to well-known definitions of protocol
structures, which facilitates the identification of the transport-layer protocol’s pay-
load. A standard practice for recognizing the contents of the transmitted payload is
to loop over a list of protocol parsers and to scan packet payloads for structures. A
protocol parser specifies a set of conditions that define the boundaries for the payload
in order for it to match the parsed protocol. These boundaries are derived from
public specifications, e.g. Request for Comments (RFC), or other public sources that
clearly define how a protocol is to be implemented. However, due to the frequent
phenomenon of bad protocol implementations, protocol parsers must compensate by
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1 PASS hax0r
2 KCIK n{US|XPa}tiwuwqy
3 RSSR tiwuwqy 0 0 :tiwuwqy
Listing 1: Mangled IRC commands from the Dorkbot malware.
introducing tolerance to the parsing process.
In this work, protocol parsing is performed by an API that is implemented in
the Python programming language5. The boundaries for a protocol are defined with
regular expressions that are applied to the first packet for each flow in the input
set of traffic captures supplied by the sandbox environments. A protocol parser can
comprise multiple regular expressions conditions that each define varying constraints
for the payload and at the same time constitute tolerance to the matching. If the first
packet of a flow matches a regular expression condition of a protocol parser, the flow
is tagged to be carrying traffic from the parser in question. Flows that don’t match a
protocol parser’s boundaries are matched against all other available protocol parsers
until a match is found or until all parsers have been exhausted. Some protocols,
e.g. messaging protocols that implement command-based communication, can be
assigned for more stringent inspection, where each packet is verified separately and
the flow is tagged only if all packets can be matched. If a flow doesn’t get tagged by
any protocol parser, it is interpreted to not carry an application-layer protocol and
is therefore marked as an unknown TCP flow. From the scope of this work, and the
implementation of these protocol parsers, follows that these unknown TCP flows,
which are left unmatched in the protocol filtering process, form the dataset that is
studied.
Allowing tolerances for protocol parsers helps in identifying the correct application-
layer protocol of a flow and facilitates the separation of malicious and benign traffic.
Some malware employ modified benign protocols that have been altered to suit the
needs of the attacker. This behaviour is shown for example by Dorkbot, which is
a Trojan horse malware that spreads through social media messages and is used
to steal personal information, such as banking credentials [46]. Listing 1 shows
three messages that constitute an actual initial check-in request made by the bot,
where the proper IRC commands NICK and USER have been mangled to KCIK and
RSSR [47]. These instances are easy to discard with protocol parsers that perform
deep inspection on all packets.
Although these protocol parsers pose an effective way of separating known proto-
cols from unknown traffic, the process includes inevitable shortcomings. Firstly, it is
acknowledged that it is impossible to be aware of the existence and specifics of all
application-layer protocols. There exist uncommon and not widely adopted protocols
that are linked to benign services and used by benign applications. Missing protocol
parser implementations can cause these protocols to remain untagged in the matching
process. Secondly, mangled or otherwise incorrect protocol implementations that
don’t parse correctly receive similar treatment. Due to these effects, the pool of flows
that is passed next to the clustering phase can contain unquantifyable amount of
5https://www.python.org/
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noise, which can have detrimental effects on the clustering results.
4.2 Clustering unknown network traffic
The clustering phase concentrates in finding correlations in the filtered network traffic.
The clustering is performed on feature vectors that are extracted from individual
flows in the traffic dataset. The features that form the grounds for the clustering
are payload sizes of sequential client request transactions in an established TCP
flow. Server transactions are not incorporated into the clustering phase due to the
simple facts that (i) C&C module implementations of malware are often static and
subjects of infrequent updates; and (ii) client-side malware often repeat messages in
their communication. Recurring messages can be caused for example by repeating
attempts of forming a connection to an unreachable C&C infrastructure, or by design
in the form of periodically sent messages, often called keepalive messages, whose
function is to keep the connection to an C&C entity open for an extended period of
time. Furthermore, malware may implement C&C protocols that operate with the
premise that the receiving C&C entity remains silent and doesn’t respond to a bots
routine messages, e.g. check-ins and data uploads, unless new commands are to be
issued. Concentrating only on client originated transaction payloads therefore offers
a more probable way of discovering intercorrelations in the dataset.
The sequence of payload sizes that forms the feature vector for a flow is initiated
from the first request of the flow. This convention is based on the assumption that
initial messages exchanged over C&C channels characterize a malware C&C protocol
better than messages that appear later in the C&C conversation. Initial messages
of a bot, e.g. check-ins and configuration information uploads, set the premise for
the subsequent instructions issued by the controlling C&C entity. This premise may
include a setting where the bot doesn’t engage in recurring C&C communication that
would provide an alternative sequence of correlating messages. Initial messages thus
represent a set of requests that are more likely to show similarities for a malware
variant and are therefore more significant for the clustering.
The clustering algorithm utilized in this research project is Density-Based Spatial
Clustering of Applications with Noise, more commonly known as DBSCAN [48].
DBSCAN is an algorithm that performs clustering according to a density-based
connectivity analysis. The algorithm attempts to find core points, i.e. points that
are densely surrounded by other points, and connect these to create dense regions as
clusters. The parameter  (eps) defines the radius of a circle around a point for which
the area contained by the circle is called the point’s -neighbourhood. The density
of a point’s -neighbourhood is measured as the total number of points that are
within -radius of that point. The parameter minPts specifies the minimum number
of points that have to be in the -neighbourhood of a point for the neighbourhood
to be considered dense, and for the center point to be considered a core point. A
cluster is defined to be the set of points in the dense -neighbourhood of a core
point. In this thesis the distances between points are expressed with the Euclidean
distance. [48, 49]
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Given a dataset, a point p in the -neighbourhood of a point q is said to be
directly density-reachable from q if q is a core point. This notion of direct reachability
is not symmetric, i.e. p being directly density-reachable from q doesn’t imply that
q is directly density-reachable from p. However, reachability is chainable in a non-
direct manner, i.e. a point r can be said to be density-reachable from point q if
point r is directly density-reachable from point p, and moreover point p is directly
density-reachable from point q. Furthermore, any points p and q are said to be
density-connected if both are density-reachable from a point o. From these definitions
follows that all points in a cluster are mutually density-connected, and any point in a
dataset that is density-reachable from a cluster is part of that cluster as well. [48, 49]
Given the parameters,  and minPts, DBSCAN propagates by looping over all
points in a dataset. For each point the algorithm performs a region query that
determines whether the -neighbourhood of the point contains at least minPts points.
If the minPts condition is not realized, the point is labeled as noise. If the condition
is realized, the point is labeled a core point and all points in its -neighbourhood
are added to a candidate set for which the process is performed next. The repeated
manner of processing a core point’s neighbours allows the cluster to be expanded and
to comprise multiple core points. When all points in the candidate set are processed,
the algorithm continues by selecting another point from the dataset that has not
been visited yet. [48, 49]
DBSCAN offers a simple way of clustering network traffic flows. Depending on
only two initial parameters,  and minPts, DBSCAN is able to perform clustering
on datasets of arbitrary shape. This feature is desireable, as the nature of malware
network communication is difficult to model. Enabled by the property of chainable
reachability, the flow feature vectors can contain deviations that cause small scattering
without affecting the result of the clustering. Given the premise of this research,
changes in the payload sizes of a single malware variant can be attributed to the
changes in the payload contents. Thus big deviations can indicate different types of
transmissions, which are acceptable to be assigned to separate clusters. Parameter
estimation and expert knowledge on the underlying dataset allow adjusting the
parameters in a manner that produces the best results.
For the purpose of this thesis a modified version of DBSCAN was implemented,
which is presented in Appendix A. The main difference to the pseudocode provided
in [48] is the inclusion of an additional filtering procedure after each region query. If a
region query for a point fulfills the minPts requirement, the created set of candidate
points is scanned for identical points and all indenticals are labeled to belong to
the cluster without explicitly visiting each point. This decision is necessitated due
to some malware, e.g. worms, that produce large quantities of identical requests
that can cause the execution of the algorithm to slow down significantly. Another
noteworthy detail in the custom implementation is the exploitation of the property
in DBSCAN that enables the usage of an arbitrary index structure for the region
queries. Because the region queries don’t assume any particular indexing method,
average computational complexities of O(n log n), where n is the size of the datset,
can be achieved by using accelerating index structures. This is a particularly great
benefit when clustering large datasets, like in the case of this work. The utilized
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Figure 11: k-NN estimation of  for three-dimensional feature vectors (07.01.2016).
DBSCAN code that is provided in Appendix A takes advantage of this by utilizing an
implementation of the KDTree spatial index structure from the scikit-learn6 Python
toolset.
In order to obtain good results from the clustering algorithm, the parameters 
and minPts need to be optimised. Ester et al. [48] describe an approach that uses
the k-nearest neighbours, or k-NN, method for estimating the value of . In this
method, for each point in the dataset, the k nearest neighbours are searched and the
distance to the most distant neighbour, i.e. the k-th neighbour, is recorded. The
obtained set of point-to-distance mappings is sorted in descending order based on
the distance and plotted in a sorted k-dist graph, where the y-axis shows the distance
values and x-axis the points. This graph illustrates for a given k, which denotes a
choice for minPts, the set of points that would be part of a cluster for a choice of
. According to Ester et al., an optimal threshold value can be found at the first
point in the first “valley” of the sorted k-dist graph. All points that are mapped to a
higher k-th distance value would be labeled as noise during the clustering, whereas
all points that have lower values would then naturally be part of a cluster. [48]
Training an algorithm to automatically detect an optimal value for  is difficult,
but it is relatively simple for a human to estimate the threshold value in a graphical
representation. Therefore the approach of visualizing the k-NN estimation is also
taken in this research work. The results of running the algorithm are shown in
Figure 11, which portrays four k-dist graphs for different values of k. The dataset
used for this estimation was extracted from the database on the 7th of January 2016
and contained all unknown TCP flows within a window of 30 days. The dataset was
6http://scikit-learn.org/
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Figure 12: k-NN estimation of  for three-dimensional feature vectors (07.02.2016).
further filtered to only contain flows that have a client request sequence that contains
at least three transactions. This means that the feature vectors were comprised of
three request payload sizes. In the figure, the effect of increasing k, i.e. minPts, can
be seen as a right shift on the x-axis. This shift can be explained by the inversely
proportional relationship between the number of obtained clusters and minPts, where
a higher constraint on the minimum cluster size naturally leads to a smaller number
of obtained clusters.
The graphs in Figure 11 show two good candidates for a threshold value for .
These are  = 4 and  = 8. The reasoning for this is that for all values of k both of
these  values show a small bend in the graphs. These bends are emphasized by the
straight horizontal lines, which represent situations where multiple values have the
same k-th distance to a neighbor. Therefore a straight line indicates that for the
corresponding  value on the y-axis a relatively large set of points may be included
in the obtained clusters thereby offering a fitting choice for the threshold value. The
choice between a higher or lower threshold point depends on the desired properties
of the output. A higher  value will produce a larger number of clusters, but features
the possible drawback where the cluster quality may be affected negatively through
the inclusion of noise, i.e. points that would be outliers with a smaller  value. A
lower  value in contrast will produce less noisy clusters, but in a smaller quantity.
As with the DBSCAN algorithm itself, identical points can cause problems to the
estimation of the threshold value. For a single feature vector, for which the number
of identical instances in the dataset is equal or larger than k, the k-th distance is 0.
Because the minPts condition is satisfied with k identical points, the k-th distance
calculation doesn’t consider other points that could be theoretically scattered densely
in the region of the point. Including identical values in the k-th distance calculation
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Figure 13: Example of the prefiltering of feature vector dimensions with D = 5.
therefore results in an inaccurate metric and provides a misleading presentation of
clusters. On the other hand filtering identical points completely from the estimation
process would generally result in too high k-th distance measures, as points, which
would fall outside of the -neighborhood of a point during the clustering, would be
included in the k-th distance estimation. To avoid the side-effects of completely
including or excluding indentical points, the estimation process jumps over the
calculation for points that have an equal or larger number of identicals compared
to k. This has the effect that for all values of k, the number of points included in
clusters for a value  is higher in reality than what is shown on the graph.
Continuous analysis on the data provided by the sandbox environment has shown
that the results of a k-NN estimation for  remain fairly constant over time. This is
illustrated in Figure 12 where a k-NN estimation was performed one month after the
previously presented estimation using identical parameters. Although the dataset
loaded from the database is completely different, the threshold values  = 4 and
 = 8 still remain good estimates for the new dataset. This could indicate that the
malware network traffic in the datasets is highly similar between the two 30-day
windows. However, the number of flows included in the window has increased by
approximately 200.
Unlike , the value for minPts is not estimated algorithmically in this research,
but is instead chosen manually based on knowledge and expertise on the dataset. In
the original DBSCAN paper, Ester et al. eliminate the problem by simply stating
that k = 4 is a good estimate for all two-dimensional datasets [48]. This value,
however, is not suitable for the purpose of this research, as the scope extends to
higher dimensions. Therefore the value for the mimimum number of points that
can form a cluster must be reasoned based on evaluating the possible side-effects of
different choices. A too high value for minPts can result in undesired exclusion of
interesting, but small, density regions from analysis. A too low value, on the other,
hand may cause effects of undersampling that can lead to lower quality signatures.
For the purpose of generating network fingerprints for specific C&C threats, the
confidence in the quality of the clusters must be high, which increases the value
constraint of minPts. Experiments and manual analysis carried out during the
realization of this proof of concept system have shown that minPts values from
3–6 are necessary to gain deep understanding of the dataset. To achieve this, the
DBSCAN algorithm is run multiple times for different values of minPts and the
results are stored separately for subsequent analysis.
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Figure 14: k-NN estimation of  for five-dimensional feature vectors (07.02.2016).
In addition to  and minPts, the choice of the number of dimensions for the
clustering phase has significant implications for the clustering output and the whole
analysis pipeline. Dimensions refer here to the number of client request payload sizes
contained in the feature vectors. Before clustering, the input dataset for DBSCAN is
prefiltered to contain only feature vectors with D or more features, where D denotes
the dimension. Specifically, feature vectors that contain less than D features are
dropped completely from the dataset, and feature vectors that contain more than D
features are cropped to the length of D. This is illustrated with a simple example
in Figure 13, where the prefiltering is performed on 4 feature vectors when D = 5.
Striped areas in the figure depict discarded or cropped feature vectors.
As a result of cropping and dropping feature vectors from the dataset, the choice
of D affects the number of generated clusters that are available for the signature
generation. In addition, D also directly affects the reliability and confidence of a
network fingerprint signature. This is due to the fact that the reliability of network
fingerprints is dependent on the quantity of client request constraints, as already
mentioned in 3.1, and therefore longer feature vectors in practice provide a premise
for higher-quality signatures. However, while inducing stronger signatures, a high
dimension delivers less signatures due to the dropping of short feature vectors. The
effect of dropping feature vectors on the number of available points for clustering
can be seen by comparing Figure 12 with Figure 14. In Figure 14 the same k-NN
estimation was performed as in Figure 12, but with D = 5. As a result, the overall
number of available points is reduced by more than 200 for each k. Because a low
dimension in turn can induce weaker signatures, finding the right balance in signature
quality and quantity through D can be difficult and depends on the wanted properties
of the outcome of the clustering phase.
39
After estimating parameters and prefiltering the dataset dimensions, the DBSCAN
clustering algorithm can be run. The output of DBSCAN is labeling information
about the generated clusters for the dataset. The label that is assigned for each point
describes to which cluster a point is assigned, or that the point is an outlier. The
goodness of the clustering and the validity of the labels is not separately verified after
running DBSCAN. Clustering in general can be viewed as an unsupervised learning
task and analysing the validity of generated clusters is intrinsically hard [19]. This is
further complicated by the difficulty of creating truth labels for malware C&C traffic,
which can take arbitrary forms and contain diverse communication patterns. Due
to these reasons the clusters are validated only later in the analysis pipeline, when
the automatically generated signatures undergo a manual inspection and refinement
process. As a result, the labeling information is passed without further processing to
the signature generation phase
4.3 Automatic signature generation
The signature generation phase concentrates in the automatic generation of network
signatures based on the cluster information produced in the previous phase. In this
process, payload size information of a cluster is combined with aggregated statistical
metrics of the individual flow payloads in order to create a precise fingerprint
description of the cluster. In particular, the produced network signatures leverage
the Shannon entropy of the indidual paylods that function as a secondary measure
with the goal of improving the reliability of the signatures. The signatures output
in this phase represent the final network fingerprints and serve as the basis for the
manual analysis in the next phase.
The signature generation algorithm loops over each cluster by filtering the initial
dataset using cluster labels as keys. The algorithm thus has access to the raw
payloads of the flows that belong to a cluster, and can perform computations on
the payloads in order to derive other metrics in addition to the payload sizes. The
output of the algorithm for one cluster is a single network signature that follows the
definition of network fingerprints from Section 3.1. The payload data for a cluster
is transformed into tuples of a signature by looping over the payload sequences in
an index-based manner and subjecting all individual payloads at an index i in the
payload sequences, where i ∈ [1, D], to the processing at the same time.
In the context of this thesis the metrics that are computed for the payloads at
an index i are the payload size and Shannon entropy. A payload size constraint
constitutes a stronger constraint to the payload matching than entropy, and is used as
the main matching feature for the targeted encrypted C&C channels. This is due to
the fact that certain protocol behaviour, e.g. handshakes, are often directly reflected
in the sequence of payload sizes. Entropy on the other hand relays information about
the format and possible encoding of the traffic. The Shannon entropy of English text
is approximately 2.8 bits per byte, while for a totally random sequence of bytes it is
8 [43]. Encrypted communication often reaches entropy values close to 8 and can
therefore be identified from cleartext traffic. A high entropy, however, doesn’t alone
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guarantee that a payload is encrypted: legitimate compressed data, e.g. images,
audio and videos, typically show high entropies as well. Therefore entropies function
as a reliability and precision improving factor in the signatures on the side of payload
size constraints.
The values inserted into a tuple depend on the distributions of the computed
metrics. Due to the explained confidence difference that a payload size constraint
and an entropy constraint exhibit on the signature, the handling for the two metrics
is divergent. A payload size constraint is always entered into the tuple regardless of
the distribution of the values, because the clustering, assuming sensible parameters,
provides guarantees that the range of values will not be arbitrarily spread. An
entropy constraint, on the other hand, is included only if the standard deviation of
the values is small. This is because the entropy value distribution is not constrained
in the process and can show high variability.
The Python pseudocode for this step is presented in Appendix B. This example
illustrates the decisions and values that are inserted into the tuples that constitute a
signature. The payload sizes and entropy values are precomputed and stored in the
two lists payload_sizes and entropy_values that are of size N×D, where N is the
number of points in the cluster and D is the dimension. The decision on the payload
size is straightforward: if all payloads at an index i have the same size, then that
value is used; if the values are distributed, then the values form a range constraint,
where the range is expanded at both ends by 1 to allow small deviations. In the
code, a range is denoted by X<>Y, where the X is the minimum value of the range
and Y is the maximum value.
As mentioned before, entropy values undergo a different handling. In the case
where all entropies for an index i are the same, the entropy is entered into the tuple as
a range, where both ends are expanded by a defined margin value, ENTROPY_MARGIN. If
the values are distributed, they are only useful if the distribution is dense. Therefore
if a condition for a maximum standard deviation, STDEVIATION_THRESHOLD, is not met
then no entropy value will be inserted into the tuple. If the condition is met and
the mean entropy is above a defined threshold, ENTROPY_THRESHOLD, then only the
minimum value of the range, subtracted by the standard deviation of the values, will
be used as a constratint. In the other case the mean entropy is low and the constraint
is inserted as a range, where both ends are expanded by the standard deviation.
When all D indexes of a cluster have been processed, the tuples are translated into
a simple human-readable signature format. This format provides a clear presentation
of the conditions of a signature and is used to describe complex queries that are
made to the malware network traffic database that is present in the network analysis
framework. Each tuple is translated into a segment, which defines keywords about the
directionality of the tuple, its index and the payload size and entropy constraint. An
example of a translated tuple could be to_server; client.idx=1; dsize=320<>323;
entropy=550<>590;, which targets the first client request that has a payload size
between 320 and 323 bytes, and an entropy between 5.5 and 5.9. Noteworthy are the
1-based indexing and the multiplication of the entropy values by 100 to avoid floating
point number operations. These segments can be chained to establish a description
for a complete signature. Further details about the translation and the signature
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format are outside of the scope of this work.
The generation process attempts to translate the essential side-channel information
that was captured in the clustering phase and present it in a flexible format. The
generated signatures represent the final network fingerprints and are used as a basis
for the analysis in the next phase. Even though this thesis focuses in the extraction
and translation of payload sizes and entropies, the framework supports additional
metrics that can be leveraged in future work.
4.4 Graphical signature and cluster analysis
The automatically generated signatures undergo next a manual analysis phase. The
main goal of this phase is to produce refined and high-quality signatures for the
subsequent conversion process that transforms the signatures to a format that is
deployable to the Suricata IDS. To achieve the goal, multiple steps are taken in
order to ensure the validity and reliability of the signatures, and the maliciousness of
the traffic that is matched by the signatures. The process involves collecting and
combining information from multiple sources and visualizing gathered data in an
illustrative manner in a versatile and effective analysis system.
The importance of human involvement in network traffic analysis can’t be over-
stated. Malware authors constantly adapt their techniques and introduce new ways
to evade detection in response to disruption efforts by security professionals. To
achieve efficiency and scalability, new detection models often employ machine learn-
ing algorithms and utilize automatic signature generation. Applying these models
on real networks requires deep knowledge of the domain, and periodic tuning of
the algorithms. Therefore, gaining thorough understanding of evasion techniques
and common C&C traffic patterns is an integral requirement for enabling precise
detection. Understanding the models and threat domain are thus significant factors
in evaluating these models and verifying the validity of the traffic that is matched by
the applied methods.
In this work manual analysis is employed for the purpose of validating the
results of the clustering and automatic signature generation, and refining their
quality. A notable side-effect of the protocol filtering is that legitimate network
traffic that employs custom or otherwise uncommon application layer protocols
may potentially pass through. This effect is enabled by the implementation of the
matching process, where all unmatched TCP traffic is assigned to the dataset that is
input to the clustering phase. The quantity and consequental effects of such incidents
for the subsequent analysis phases are mitigated through the notion of outliers in
DBSCAN, which allows the identification and discarding of uncorrelating network
traffic. Nevertheless, some benign network traffic might pass through both these
phases and end up in the queue for signature generation. Therefore, enabled by the
clear and simple human-readable format of the generated signatures, the manual
analysis phase serves an important purpose for the quality assurance of the detection
capability.
To facilitate manual analysis, a visualization tool was built to illustrate products
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Figure 15: Graphical cluster and signature presentation.
of the previous phases. This visualization tool, created with D3.js7, JavaScript and
HTML, is depicted in Figure 15, where 80 signature clusters and their interrela-
tionships are presented. In the figure, each cluster corresponds to a signature and
is depicted as a coloured tightly packed group of circles. Each circle in a cluster
represents a single malware sample that was executed in a sandbox environment.
The radius of a circle reflects the number of flows that were generated during the
sandbox analysis and that are matched by a signature. Cases, where a sample has
generated flows during the sandbox execution that match on different signatures,
are illustrated with faint grey lines that connect two circles of the same sample in
different clusters.
The visualization tool provides a comprehensive overview of the signature gener-
ation products and provides helpful information to an analyst about the clusters,
samples and flows. The number of circles that form a cluster relays information
about the corresponding signature. A large cluster can indicate for example either
that a disproportionate number of samples from a specific malware is present in the
7https://d3js.org/
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dataset, or that the generated signature describes a sequence of requests in a manner
that is too relaxed and therefore matches samples from several malware. Insight to
this problem can be gathered from the sizes of the circles in the cluster. In particular
helpful are the facts that malware samples of single variant typically exhibit similar
network behaviour and that the number of matching flows for a sample is reflected
in the size of the circle. Therefore clusters with uniform distribution of circle sizes
can indicate that the samples in the cluster are from the same malware. If, on the
other hand, the size distribution is clearly not uniform, the signature of the cluster
is likely to match on multiple malware.
The effect of the choice for the clustering parameters becomes particularly apparent
with small clusters. Due to the fact that the clustering is performed on single flows
instead of single samples, a cluster can be solely comprised of flows generated by
a single sample. Examples of this can be seen in Figure 15 closer to the edge of
the visualization. Small clusters in general are an important target of analysis, as
uncommon malware, or malware that are used in isolated and targeted attacks, would
presumably produce only a limited presence in the dataset. The reliability of an
accurate signature constituted by a small cluster is however less reliable, because
its generation is based on limited sampling of the malware. Attempts to improve
the reliability can be made by tuning the  and minPts values of DBSCAN. The
effects of changing these parameters may have particularly strong effects for small
clusters, as for example increasing minPts, or lowering , may result in the exclusion
of a small cluster from a clustering run. Experimenting on the input parameters is
therefore useful for uncovering important clusters.
To aid an analyst in the analysis process, the visualization tool provides infor-
mation about the displayed samples in an interactive manner. This is implemented
by tracking mouse click events and showing related information on the target of the
selection. The interactive user interface (UI) is depicted in Figure 16. For example,
connections between circles can be highlighted by clicking on a circle. This has the
effect that linked circles are selected, while the rest of the circles are filled with a grey
colour. Furthermore, double clicking a circle expands the selection to the current
cluster and any circle that is linked to a circle in the cluster, which can also be seen
in the figure. Selection events on circles invoke an API call that loads useful threat
intelligence from a database. This information is displayed on the left side of the
UI and includes details about the selected malware samples, the threat class and
family of the sample, the analysis score in the sandbox and the detection ratio in
the VirusTotal malware scanning service. In addition, information is shown about
the currently selected circle and all circles that are linked to the selection. The tool
currently doesn’t implement the functionality to map a signature to the visualization,
e.g. through a search function, but this is part of planned improvements.
The information that is displayed in the visualization UI is used as a basis for
decisions about the quality of the signatures. A signature can be defined to be of
good quality when at least the following points are fulfilled: (i) the signature matches
the communication of only a single specific threat; and (ii) the signature coverage
extends to all communication of a specific sort for a threat. The first condition states
that signatures should not cover C&C traffic of multiple malware. Constraining
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Figure 16: Performing graphical cluster and signature analysis.
signatures to cover only a single threat allows for accurate threat attribution and
decreases the risk of defining too broad signatures. The second condition states that
in an optimal case a signature should cover well a type of C&C communication that
can contain variants. For example, this means that a check-in of a malware should
be matched also in cases where the check-in contains variants. Due to the limited
material and information that is available for analysis, these conditions should be
realized to the extent that is possible.
The analysis process for a signature takes into account multiple aspects when
producing a decision. A major aspect in the signature analysis is the composition
of the clusters, which is tested for compliance with the first condition that was
mentioned above. The threat information in the UI is aggregated data that has been
loaded from various sources, most notably internal threat intelligence storages of the
existing malware analysis platform and VirusTotal. The aggregation procedure that
is run in the network analysis system attempts to derive meaningful threat classes
and families for each sample that has been analysed in the sandbox environment.
An example of this data can be seen in Figure 16, where the threat information
for the samples of the selected cluster is displayed in a table. A potentially good
signature is characterized by a unique threat class and threat family. This scenario
is, however, not always fulfilled, because threat attribution is difficult and ambiguous
across anti-virus vendors’ results in VirusTotal, and can include inaccuracies [50].
These cases require deeper analysis on the network traffic generated by the samples
in order to verify whether they belong to the same threat class and family. This
scenario is also portrayed in the figure, where the samples would undergo a further
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manual analysis to verify whether the backdoor “Bladabindi” is an accurate threat
family for all of the samples.
Another major aspect in the analysis process is the general verification of ma-
liciousness of the samples in a cluser. This verification is a standard process for
all clusters, but is necessitated in particular by clusters that don’t have aggregated
threat information available. An example of a possible cause for this scenario are
novel malware that haven’t been subject of widespread analysis and naming yet. A
general maliciousness verification can be based on a number of information sources,
but due to the availability of an advanced sandbox environment the decision is largely
based on the results of the dynamic sandbox analysis.
The available sandbox employs full system emulation (FUSE) to analyse samples.
This enables a full instruction by instruction view into the execution of a sample and
provides accurate detection and fingerprinting capabilities of the runtime environment.
The analysis system can thus detect and circumvent attempts by the malware to
identify and evade the dynamic execution. As a result of the resistance to detection,
in an optimal case the sandbox is able to induce the same malicious behaviour from
a malware sample that it would exhibit on a normal infected machine, including
network traffic. Due to the high sophistication of the sandbox environment, the
produced analysis report can be used as a reliable basis for the decision of a samples
maliciousness. This decision is, however, always supplemented with information from
other sources, such as VirusTotal, when available. [51]
Assigning a threat name for a malware that is matched by a signature can be more
complicated for linked samples. As previously mentioned, links between samples
correspond to cases, where traffic generated by an analysed sample is matched by
multiple signatures. This can indicate that the signatures match on different types
of traffic of the same malware, which is a desireable finding as it fulfills the first
condition of a good signature. On the other hand, the information can indicate
that the clustering has produced noisy and inaccurate results. Furthermore, it is
possible that the sample submitted for sandbox anlysis is a type of malware that
loads a second malware, which generates some network traffic of its own. In order to
attribute a threat to linked samples, information that supports the loading of another
malware has to be found, or the suspicion can be dismissed. The general procedures
for this are manual network traffic analysis on the samples, which attempts to find
network traces of download events, and inspection of the sandbox analysis reports.
The main goal of the manual analysis phase is to produce refined and high
quality signatures. In the event where a cluster has undergone manual verification
for maliciousness and threat composition, the signature is tuned to provide a match
as precise as possible. This phase attempts to satisfy the second general condition of
a good signature, while keeping the set of matched threats contained to the intended
malware. By experimenting with the generated signature constraints and searching
the database with different queries, outliers that were possibly discarded in the
clustering phase can be discovered and incorporated into the signature. Through
this process the signature is refined to both higher accuracy and precision.
At this stage in the analysis process the full potential of the network fingerprint
definition can be harnessed through the introduction of server response constraints
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into the signatures. The motivation for this is based on the objective of achieving
performant detection that is both reliable and accurate. The premise, and optimal
condition, for this phase is thus an already established high quality network signature
that fulfills the general conditions of a good signature. The benefit of incorporating
response constraints to the signatures is the improved reliability through an increased
number of constraints. This is amplified by the fact that server responses are
delineated by the state machine of the receiving C&C entity and incorporating
constraints for a second state machine would thus improve the reliability and resistance
of a signature against false positive detection events. Moreover, if server response
constraints can be incorporated into a signature, another possibility is to reduce the
number of client request constraints in the signature for additional performance gains.
Limiting the number of client request constraints in the signature reduces the number
of requests that have to be tracked by the IDS in order to perform detection and
therefore enables the release of resources earlier. Due to these beneficial properties,
the possiblity of including server constraints should be examined and taken advantage
of when possible.
4.5 Network fingerprints in Suricata
Signatures that are refined and produced in the manual analysis phase are next
deployed to the Suricata IDS. In this phase the signatures are converted into a format
that is supported by Suricata and fulfills Suricata’s specifications. An important
aspect in this phase is the precision of the final converted format, which can have
significant effects on the efficiency of applying rules on network traffic. This work
won’t focus on the actual conversion script, but explains the matching methodology
of network fingerprints with Suricata. The conversion takes as its input a set of
network signatures, and produces three files that effectively represent the concrete
final form of the network fingerprints.
The Suricata IDS is placed on the edge between two networks to perform network
traffic monitoring. Traffic is matched by comparing the definitions in Suricata
signatures to the monitored traffic. The signatures follow the Suricata signature
language format that defines various rules and constraints for when a flow matches,
and furthermore specify how a match event is handled. In general, a match event for
a packet is triggered when all specified constraints in a signature are fulfilled. Upon
starting Suricata, signatures are loaded from a file for which the filepath is defined
in the configuration file of the IDS.
The Suricata signature language specification describes multiple keywords that
define how a signature should be parsed and applied on the monitored traffic. These
keywords can define for example content constraints, perl compatible regular expres-
sions (PCRE) and distance parameters for the matching of subsequent constraints.
For example, for HTTP flows these keywords provide an easy way to place contraints
on different parts of the HTTP request, such as the “http_uri” keyword for the
HTTP URI or “http_method” for the HTTP method. The support for a multitude
of different keywords allows the composition of precise signatures and provides a
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flexible way of targeting complex structures in packets.
An additional useful feature of Suricata is the chainability of signatures, which
allows matching on packet sequences. This chainability is implemented through
flowbits that are special register values that can be set by a signature for a matching
packet, and later verified for by another signature that targets the same flow. Thus
by setting a flowbit, a signature that targets a packet at the start of a flow can
relay information about the match to another signature that targets a subsequent
packet. If the flowbit is not set by the first signature, the second signature is not
matched further after verifying the flowbit. By suppressing alerts and relaying match
information through flowbits, positive decisions for packet sequences in a flow can
be chained until the last Suricata signature for a given flow raises an alert. The
additional benefit of chaining signatures with flowbits is that Suricata only has to
store a single bit for a sequence of signatures instead of maintaining a complex state
in memory for each detector.
The keywords and the chainability of signatures enable the basis for implementing
network fingerprints in Suricata. The tuples of a network fingerprint can be chained
by setting and checking flowbits in separate Suricata signatures that define and verify
the constraints for the values in a tuple. The Suricata signature specification defines
the keyword “dsize” that can be used to set a constraint on the payload size of a
packet. However, the specification doesn’t directly define keywords for the two other
required elements in a network fingerprint, i.e. packet index and payload entropy.
In order to match on packet indexes and paylod entropies, the presented system
leverages the scriptability of Suricata. Suricata provides an interface for Lua scripting,
which is enabled by the just-in-time (JIT) compilation of Lua scripts. Lua scripts can
be invoked by Suricata signatures through the use of two Lua specific keywords, “lua”
or “luajit”, which take as argument the path to a Lua script. The interface exposed
to Lua scripts provides visibility on packet payloads of a flow and thereby enables
arbitrary calculations to be performed, including the computation of a payload’s
entropy. The interface implements a “match” function, which is used to set the flowbit
of a Suricata signature from Lua. Decisions to stop matching on a flow can therefore
be made directly from the Lua script.
Lua scripts have also the capability of exposing values to other Suricata signatures.
This can be achieved with the use of flowint variables, which store an integer value
and make it accessible from other signatures through the keyword “flowint” and the
name of the flowint variable as argument. Flowint variables can therefore be used
like regular keyword constraints in the matching process. A Suricata signature that
is part of a network fingerprint signature chain can thereby verify all necessary tuple
value conditions for a given packet in the sequence, i.e. packet index, payload size
and entropy. In order to store the entropy values in flowints, a computed entropy
value is multiplied by 100 and cut at the decimal point.
The implementation of network fingerprints relies ultimately on three files: two
Lua scripts and a signature file. Because Suricata operates on a packet basis
and exposes the packet payload to the Lua scripts without a notion of client or
server transaction, separate files are required for the computation of client and
server entropies and indexes. The Lua files are invoked for each TCP packet from
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the signature file by two signatures that are designated for this special purpose.
The invocation of the two scripts for client and server transactions exposes the
entropies and indexes in the flowints “client.idx”, “server.idx”, “client.entropy” and
“server.entropy”. These flowints are available for the matching operation for a packet
until the packet is dismissed and new values are computed for the next incoming
packet.
An example of a signature file is presented in Appendix C. The signatures in
the file are stripped from keywords that are not relevant in the context of this
work, but are necessary for Suricata, and the file would therefore not work in a real
Suricata environment. In the file, the two Suricata signatures from the top invoke the
Lua scripts fingerprint.lua and fingerprint_server.lua, which are responsible for
incrementing the index and computing the payload entropy of an incoming packet.
The flowints computed and exposed are used in the four last Suricata signatures
that comprise the network fingerprint. The simple form of the network fingerprint
contained in the last four Suricata signatures is displayed in Listing 2. Each of the
constraints in the listing are included through regular Suricata keywords or through
flowints. The sequence in the matching operation is achieved with the flowbits NF.1
to NF.3. When a signature in the sequence matches on a packet, it sets the flowbit
that is checked by the next signature in the network fingerprint. In the case of
the example, only if the first three signatures have matched on their packets, the
flowbit NF.3 will be set. If the last signature matches its corresponding packet, then
it generates alert about a match event.
to_server; client.idx=1; dsize =141; entropy = >550;||
to_server; client.idx=2; dsize =97; entropy = >550;||
to_server; client.idx=3; dsize =23 < >37;||
to_server; client.idx=4; dsize =65;
Listing 2: Simple form of the network fingerprint in Appendix C.
The conversion algorithm available in this phase converts network fingerprints
from the format presented in Listing 2 to format presented in Appendix C. In this
process the two Lua scripts are created and placed into a shared directory with the
generated Suricata signature file. The files are then shipped to the network sensors
to be deployed to the Suricata intrusion detection system and to be employed in the
detection of encrypted C&C channels.
4.6 Event analysis system
After deployment, the generated network fingerprints undergo a mandatory test
phase where the validity of their behaviour is verified. This test phase is enabled
by the intrusion detection and malware analysis platform that is available in the
context of this research. The context offers a production environment, which consists
of multiple real-world customer networks that are comprised of thousands of hosts.
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The availability of such framework for testing purposes is atypical to state of the art
research projects and thus provides the unique opportunity to perform large-scale
testing on the network fingerprint technique. The main goal of the testing phase
is to verify that the generated network fingerprints are a feasible detection method
for encrypted C&C channels. This is determined by evaluating the effects on the
performance of the network sensors, and the qualitive and quantitive analysis on the
generated detection events.
Events generated by deployed network fingerprint detectors propagate to an
event analysis system that is part of the network analysis system. As mentioned
in Section 3.2, this system is used by analysts to inspect generated events and to
analyse the behaviour of the detectors. For this purpose, the event analysis system
provides a comprehensive overview of a detector and offers detailed information about
generated events from all network sensors that employ the detector. This internal
analysis system facilitates the manual verification of the behaviour of test mode
detectors, and allows a thorough inspection process on the correctness of detectors
before they are promoted to a real mode. Promoting a detector to real mode has the
notable effect that raised events are further propagated to external systems that are
accessible by the customers. Therefore promoting a detector is a significant decision
that must be justifyable by the generated events.
The deployment of network signatures to the production environment offers a
straightforward testing methodology that provides quantifyable information about
the quality of detectors. This information is based on the verification of events that
are generated through exposing the detectors to large volumes of user generated
network traffic. The verification attempts to determine whether an event generated
by a detector matches correctly on the targeted malicious traffic, i.e. it’s a true
positive detection, or whether the matched traffic is something that was not intended
to be targeted, i.e. it’s a false positive detection. Based on the assumption that
traffic generated by real users is comprised for the most part of benign traffic, this
methodology is in principle especially effective in testing detectors for false positive
events. The decision whether an event is a true or false positive can be tagged to the
event, which is then shown in the combined information for the detector in the event
analysis system. A detector typically requires a number of true positive decisions
before it can be considered for promotion to real mode.
The verification process for a detector starts when a sensor generates detection
events. The starting point for the verification is the network traffic that raised the
event. This is enabled by the feature in the sensor, where a buffer of packets that
match a network signature are stored and sent as part of the event information
to various internal systems. This network traffic is then accessible through the
event analysis system along with metadata about the network flow. The decision
on the network traffic relies on the knowledge and understanding of the analyst
about the detector and the threat that is targeted. In simple cases, where the packet
contents in the event data provide strong evidence for a supporting or undermining
decision, deeper analysis on the event metadata and detector information may not
be necessary, as the knowledge on the malicious network traffic can be sufficient.
This can be particularly true for detectors that target C&C communication that
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exhibits characteristic features in the traffic. More difficult cases have to take into
account additional metadata about the event, such as host and DNS information, IP
addresses and port numbers, and related events for the threat or other detectors.
The decision processes for network fingerprint detectors are emphasized by their
meticulous type. This is due to the fact that encrypted C&C channels don’t exhibit
characteristic invariants in the packets payloads and may be difficult to identify
reliably based on the network traffic. However, due to this property of the targeted
threat type, identification of clear false positive events is simpler: if the event data
of a detector that targets encrypted communication contains plaintext strings, the
event is likely to be a false positive. Encrypted looking traffic, on the other hand,
can be generated next to a malicious threat also by a benign protocol. Verification
processes for network fingerprints therefore usually involve deriving a decision from a
combined set of available information about the threat, the detector and the events.
The action taken for a detector depends on the decisions that have been produced
for the detector. False positive decisions for a detector means that the detector is
bad and does not pass the verification process. The action taken in this case is the
disabling of the detector, which means that the network sensors stop applying the
detector on network traffic. Depending on the false positive events and the number and
type of constraints in the network signature, the detector can be discarded completely
or alternatively improved through a loop back to the manual analysis phase of the
signature generation. When a detector is returned to manual refinement, the new
signature has to undergo a new verification phase. However, event information from
the bad detector can serve as supporting information for decisions on the events
for the improved detector and thereby contribute to the general event verification
process.
The action for a detector that has produced true positive decisions depends on
the time frame in which the events were generated. A detector, which has been an
extended period of time in the test phase and hasn’t generated any false positive
events, can be considered reliable and thus promoted to real mode. However, if a
detector generates true positive events soon after being deployed to the sensors, it
proves the accuracy of the detector, i.e. that it matches on malicious traffic, but
doesn’t guarantee reliably its precision, i.e. that the threat matches only on malicious
traffic. Therefore a minimum amount time that a detector has to remain in the test
phase should be enforced.
4.7 Summary
Establishing network fingerprint signatures involves a multistep process pipeline,
where each stage transforms the input data before passing it on to a subsequent stage.
The process is commenced with a protocol filtering step, where the network traffic
generated in the sandbox analysis environments is parsed and filtered to fit into the
scope of this research. TCP traffic that is not matched by the available protocol
matchers is tagged as unknown and transferred to the clustering phase. The clustering
phase focuses in the extraction of payload size correlations between client request
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sequences. These correlations are described in clusters that are generated with the
density-based DBSCAN clustering algorithm. The correlating payload size sequences
are combined with payload entropy information in the signature generation stage.
This stage is responsible for deriving accurate constraints for the formed clusters and
providing simple human-readable signature representations for the clusters. These
signatures are visualised in the manual analysis phase, where the signatures undergo
a refinement and improvement process. The beneficial properties provided in this
phase underline the importance of manual analysis in the generation of network
fingerprints, and for network traffic analysis processes in general. The refined network
fingerprint signatures are then converted to a format that is supported by the Suricata
IDS. The detection in Suricata leverages the scriptability of Suricata through Lua.
The converted format is then shipped to the network sensors to be employed in the
detection of encrypted C&C traffic. This phase involves a mandatory test period, in
which the network fingerprint detectors are verified for reliability and accuracy of
detecting the targeted malicious traffic.
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5 Evaluation and discussion of the proof of
concept
In this chapter the results of the researched proof of concept are presented and
discussed. The results are evaluated against the research goals that were introduced
in Chapter 3. The first section presents the results of running a number of detectors
in the test environment for a test period, and illustrates the performance impact of
carrying out Lua supported detection with Suricata. The second section discusses
the results and the test environment, and considers the theoretical and practical
effects that it induces on the results. The last section provides a short summary of
the whole chapter.
5.1 Research results
The main objective of this research was to produce a proof of concept for a network-
based detection capability of encrypted C&C channels. This goal was approached by
introducing the concept of network fingerprints. The theoretical concept was realized
by designing and implementing a multistep analysis pipeline for the generation and
verification of network fingerprints. Towards the end of the research five network
fingerprints were generated using the built pipeline. These were deployed in test
mode to the production environment networks provided by the network detection and
malware analysis solution by Lastline Inc. on the 25.01.2016. This section presents
two of the detectors and the results that were obtained during the test period.
Detector 1, for which the simple form is shown in Listing 3, targets the Tofsee
spambot. The signature consists of four client request packets that all have payload
size constraints for unique values, except for the third payload, which targets a range.
The two first payloads showed high entropies during the manual analysis, which were
included into the signature as threshold values. Tofsee uses a custom encryption
algorithm to conceal the cleartext C&C protocol messages. The first client request
sent by the bot includes information about the victim machine, such as local time
and system version. The subsequent requests can deliver configuration files and
various other information extracted by the bot from the victim machine, which can
cause variations to the sequence of transmitted payloads. During manual analysis it
was noticed, however, that this particular sequence of four requests occurs frequently
in the C&C communication generated by Tofsee samples and was therefore targeted
in a network fingerprint. [52]
53
to_server; client.idx=1; dsize =141; entropy = >550;||
to_server; client.idx=2; dsize =97; entropy = >550;||
to_server; client.idx=3; dsize =23 < >37;||
to_server; client.idx=4; dsize =65;
Listing 3: Network fingerprint for the Tofsee detector.
Detector 2 targets check-in activity from the Netwire remote access trojan (RAT)
malware. The fingerprint generated against this threat targets the four first requests
of the RAT, which are presented in Listing 4. According to the security research
article by Da Silva et al., Netwire RAT uses the 256-bit AES algorithm to encrypt
its communication. The messages sent by the RAT are comprised of a 4 byte length
header, a 1 byte command header and an optional data section. The first request by
the RAT is always 69 bytes long and functions as a session initialization and key
exchange message with the C&C server. After the key exchange the bot sends a
variable length acknowledgement message that is therefore targeted in the signature
with the payload size constraint of 57 to 75 bytes. After the second request the
malware starts sending periodical heartbeat messages that don’t incorporate a data
section and are thus only 5 bytes long. These heartbeat messages are targeted with
the third and fourth payload constraints in the fingerprint. [53]
to_server; client.idx=1; dsize =69; entropy =542 < >602;||
to_server; client.idx=2; dsize =57 < >75;||
to_server; client.idx=3; dsize =5;||
to_server; client.idx=4; dsize =5;
Listing 4: Network fingerprint for the Netwire RAT detector.
The test period spanned 17 days from the deployment date until the 11.02.2016.
During this period the network sensors generated altogether 80 events for the five
detectors. These events were, however, divided only between the presented Tofsee
and the Netwire RAT detectors, where the Tofsee detector generated 71 events and
the Netwire RAT detector 9. Therefore the other three detectors are not presented in
this section, but are discussed in the next section. The results obtained from the test
period are presented in Table 1, where each of the detectors that generated events is
displayed on separate rows with the true positive and false positive numbers in the 2
rightmost columns.
Table 1: The number of true positive and false positive detections for each detector.
Detector number # True positives # False positives
1 71 0
2 0 9
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Figure 17: True positive detection for the Tofsee spambot malware.
The results obtained during the test period provide clear indication that the
Tofsee detector performs well and should be considered to be promoted to real mode.
In the verification process of these events it was confirmed that all 71 of the generated
events are true positive detections of the targeted C&C channel. This detector thus
proves that the network fingerprint approach for detecting encrypted C&C channels
works in practice. Figure 17 illustrates one of the generated events in the event
analysis system and displays the network traffic that was detected successfully. It
is clear from the figure that the network traffic could not have been detected with
conventional pattern-based techniques and would have otherwise passed undetected
through the traffic monitor in the IDS if not for the deployed network fingerprint
detector.
Detector 2, on the other hand, performed less well in the test period. The Netwire
RAT detector generated nine verified false positive events and no true positive events,
which are sufficient reasons to not consider promoting the detector. Eight of the
nine events were false detections on TLS handshakes and the remaining one matched
on a benign HTTP request. The false positive events nevertheless provide useful
information about the reliabilty of network fingerprints and how similar false positives
could be avoided in the future. Deeper analysis into the nine events revealed that
the main probable cause for all false detections were TCP flows that contained
retransmissions and out-of-order packet arrivals.
Figure 18 illustrates this problem and displays the packet capture from one of
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Figure 18: TCP retransmissions as probable cause for FP events.
the false posivite events on a TLS handshake. In the figure the payloads that were
matched by the signature are transmitted in packets 5, 6, 11 and 12. Looking at
the sequence of packets and the information in the capture, it is apparent that
packet 6 is a retransmission of packet 5 and similarly packet 12 is a retransmission
of packet 11. A reasonable deduction from this is that the false positive events were
caused by duplicate packets being sent over the network and the signature targeting
similar malicious traffic. Therefore the events were the result of a corner case of
benign protocol behaviour, which could not have been taken into account during the
signature generation phase due to the limited set of traffic available in the network
analysis database. Suricata’s flow reassembler might have significance on the false
detections as well, but details about the operation of Suricata and finding proof for
this hypothesis are outside of the scope of this research and part of future work.
The false positive events of the Netwire RAT detector provide insights about
how the false detection events, and potentially similar events in the future, could
be avoided. Because eight of the nine events matched on TLS handshakes and one
on an HTTP request, a straightforward way to avoid similar false detections is to
instruct Suricata to attempt to match on traffic that utilizes ports other than 443
and 80. This approach, however, has a significant downside due to the common
evasion technique, where malware connect to well-known ports to bypass firewalls,
as was described in Section 2.3. Therefore imposing restrictions on well-known ports
can cause false negative detections, i.e. undetected malicious behaviour, and should
be based on reliable sources, e.g. reverse engineering a sample. A port constraint for
this detector would therefore require analysis on the protocol implementation of the
malware to support or dismiss the action.
Another approach to limit the likelihood of false positive events is to increase
the number of constraints in the signature. Because the protocol behaviour for this
particular threat is known, extending the heartbeat sequence with additional payload
size constraints would reduce the probability of matching on further retransmitted
packets. This approach, however, is still vulnerable to multiple sequential TCP
retransmissions and provides therefore only weak guarantees for improvement. A
preferable option would be to instead incorporate server response constraints to the
signature and thereby prevent duplicate hits on client TCP retransmissions from
triggering a detection. This approach provides an easy solution in the particular case
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Figure 19: HTTP and SSL performance test with Lua disabled.
of Netwire RAT, because the server responses follow a similar distinctive and easy to
match pattern as the client requests.
In addition to qualitative analysis on the events generated by network fingerprint
signatures, the effects on the performance of Suricata were also tested. The goal of
the performance tests was to measure the effects of carrying out detection in Suricata
that leverages Lua scripting. The test setup consisted of a network with two hosts:
a client host that generates requests, and a server host that serves resposes to the
requests and additionally runs Suricata. The basic test methodology was to run a
daemon on the client host that would generate network traffic towards the server and
measure the performance of Suricata in processing the requests and the responses in
the two test cases where Lua scripts are invoked and when they are not. Each test
case was carried out for two different protocols, in this case HTTP and Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL), in order to gain further insights about the effects of the protocol. The
daemon was instructed to generate and maintain 100 parallel connections towards
the server, which in turn was instructed to respond with 100 kilobytes of random
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Figure 20: HTTP and SSL performance test with Lua enabled.
gzipped data per transaction. Furthermore each test was run on a 500 Mbps link
and a 1 Gbps link to illustrate the behaviour and performance of Suricata in high
speed context. Further stress was induced to Suricata by randomising the end point
IP addresses and ports for each flow so that different optimising techniques could
not be potentially utilized.
The two performance test scenarios are depicted in Figures 19 and 20. The top
row in each figure depicts the test measurements with the HTTP protocol and the
bottom row with SSL. The left column in the figures portrays the CPU load in
absolute number of ticks, while the right column shows the cumulative packet loss
percent. In each graph the 500 Mbps test is shown in green and the 1 Gbps test in
blue.
The top row in Figure 19 for the 500 Mbps speed shows the development of the
cumulative packet loss. During the 300 second test period the amount of packet
lost grows steadily and reaches approximately 17 % at the end of the test. This
observation tells that Suricata starts losing packets after a period when the load
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is constant. This is because Suricata reaches its the maximum buffering capacity,
which occurs for the 500 Mbps test a short time later than in the 1 Gbps test. For
the 1 Gbps test the packet loss rises during the first 100 seconds to approximately 37
%, after which the test for unknown reasons “recovers” causing Suricata to be able
to process more packets. After a short period, however, the cumulative packet loss
starts growing again and reaches approximately 32 % at the 300 second mark. The
amount of packet loss is reflected in the CPU load graphs. At lower speed Suricata is
able to receive incoming packets in higher quantity and thus the stress on the CPU
during the packet processing is higher. At the 1 Gbps speed Suricata drops more
packets, which then don’t end up being processed, and the CPU load is therefore
lower. Similar observations are true for SSL, although the packet loss for the 500
Mbps link coulnd’t be measured. The packet loss of the 1 Gbps test shows that
approximately 35 % of the received packets are dropped.
Figure 20 shows the performance measurements for the test case where Lua was
enabled. For the 500 Mbps test with HTTP the packet loss rises to about 22 %,
while in the 1 Gbps test the packet loss reaches approximately 46 %. In the 1 Gbps
SSL test the packet loss grows up to 37 %. Comparing the two test cases shows
that enabling Lua causes a 5–9 % increase in packet loss for HTTP and a 2 % loss
for SSL. The tick count, which describes the CPU load during packet processing,
remains approximately at the same levels for all tests with HTTP. Enabling Lua
computations on a sensor therefore doesn’t affect the load on the CPU after packets
have been accepted. For SSL, on the other hand, the average CPU load experiences
a slight increase.
5.2 Discussion
The test environment available for the research provided the unique and significant op-
portunity to test the established network fingerprint technique in real-world networks.
The benefit of this kind of environment is invaluable for the qualitative testing process
as it exposes the tested signatures to large volumes of benign traffic. User generated
real-world network traffic includes edge and corner cases in the communication that
would normally be impossible to test for in a separated test environment. Thus,
the environment used for the testing of the proof of concept in this research is an
invaluable asset that provides supporting arguments for the correct functionality of
the presented proof of concept system.
The test environment facilitated especially the testing for false positive events.
This feature is desireable, as deriving a theoretical model for the combination of the
number and type of signature constraints for a reliable signature is a difficult task,
as mentioned in Section 3.2. Based on the conducted experiments and the obtained
results that were presented in the previous section, it can be concluded that at least
four client transaction payload size constraints and two entropy contraints can be
enough to produce an accurate and well performing detector. The specifics of these
constraints and their combination, however, have an effect on the reliability of the
detector, as was observed for the Netwire RAT detector. False positive detections
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for test detectors nevertheless provide advantageous insights into the context traffic
that generated the events, and thereby enable the improvement of the detectors and
the signature generation methodologies.
An important aspect to take into account, when making inferences about the
minimum requirements of constraints for a reliable detector, is that the available
test environment can not be used to test for a given threat at will. The infections
in a network are a variable in the test environment that is uncontrollable and
unpredictable. Therefore the correctness of a signature in detecting certain malware
communication can not be planned to be concluded through the number of generated
true positive events in a certain test period. Instead, detectors may be left in the
testing phase for extended periods of time until supporting events for a promoting or
disabling action are received. A lack of events can thus indicate either that (i) the
detector is faulty and therefore doesn’t match benign or malicious behaviour; or
that (ii) the detector is not very bad, as it doesn’t generate false positive events, but
the production environment networks don’t contain active infections of the targeted
malware.
Malware activity is often limited to short periods of time until the infections
have been cleaned, and therefore the C&C activity targeted with a detector that
would serve as the grounds for a decision is not available anymore. Knowledge of
this possibility in the test environment enables the undesireable situation where
faulty detectors are assumed to be functioning properly, but simply don’t receive
events due to the lack of malware activity. Such assumptions can lead to a scenario
where a malware is still active in the test environment, but is not matched due
to the faultiness of the detector. These events are false negative detections and
are impossible to measure in the context of the available test environment. These
indications, or a combination of both, may also be the decisive factor for why the
three other detectors, which had similar constraints as the two other ones, didn’t
produce any events and therefore can’t be reasoned on more extensively. A general
deduction from this is that any event for a detector, i.e. true positive or false positive,
is more useful and therefore more favorable than not receiving events at all.
The performance tests show that the network fingerprint capability induces a small
performance penalty. The performance penalty was most visible in the cumulative
packet loss, which experienced an increase of 2–9 % for both tested protocols. The
CPU load on the other hand remained unaffected in the HTTP test with Lua and
showed only a slight increase for SSL. These penalties to the performance of Suricata
form only a minor drawback for incorporating the capability to detect encrypted
C&C channels. Due to their evasive characteristics and difficulty of matching with
conventional pattern-based techniques, the threats targeted with network fingerprints
may otherwise go completely undetected. The tests carried out in this research
alone showed that 71 C&C channels would not have been detected if the technique
wasn’t employed. A general conclusion from this consideration is that the benefit of
employing network fingerprints outweighs the small performance penalties caused by
it.
The relatively limited time frame that was available for the experimental phase
had unfortunate effects on the testing. A major feature that couldn’t be incorporated
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to the testing phase due to its late introduction to the analysis system was the
support for server transaction constraints. As has been previously reasoned in this
work, server transaction constraints in network fingerprints theoretically provide
significant additional reliability and robustness against false positives. Further tests
that measure the improvements brought by server transaction constraints and provide
a comparison to client transaction-only signatures are left for future work.
Another unfortunate effect of the short test period was that a large scale testing
with a greater number of detectors could not be carried out. The main drawback
of this is the lost opportunity to collect additional quantitative information about
network fingerprint detectors. Although the obtained results are toned down by the
small scale of the test phase, the carried out performance measurements and the
generated events allow drawing the following conclusions:
1. Network fingerprints are a performant technique that is feasible to deploy to
large production environment networks
2. Network fingerprints are capable of accurately detecting real malicious encrypted
C&C channels
Even though the approach presented in this work has proven to be an effective
and performant way of detecting customly encrypted C&C channels, there exist
some evasions that can be employed by attackers to thwart network fingerprint-
based detection. As network fingerprints ultimately only depend on extracted
message length and entropy information in C&C communication, in order to preserve
confidentiality of the transmitted C&C messages, useful attacks against the detection
mechanism can only focus on tampering message lengths. The general aim of such
attacks would be to confuse the clustering algorithm by reducing the correlation
between extracted feature vectors, which would lead to a lower number of identified
clusters and ultimately a lower number of generated signatures.
Reducing the correlation between extracted feature vectors can be approached by
introducing randomness to the C&C message sequences. This could be achieved for
example by appending or prepending padding of random length to each message, and
including the length and position of the padding with the message. This technique
has been previously employed by Zeus P2P [12] and Poison Ivy [54] to thwart traffic
analysis. Another option is to extend the C&C protocol of the malware to inject
additional redundant random length messages at arbitrary positions in the message
sequence. These messages can be simply discarded by the communicating endpoints
after decryption, but the defender wouldn’t be able distinguish them from other
C&C messages. To the knowledge of the author this technique hasn’t been employed
by any malware thus far.
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6 Conclusions
The threat landscape of the Internet has evolved drastically in the past two decades.
The number of malware has grown to hundreds of millions unique samples in 2016
and new threats are introduced continuously by malicious actors. The evolution
of the threat landscape has been induced by technological advancements that have
resulted in the proliferation of personal computers and other connected digital devices.
This proliferation has opened a new lucrative business opportunity for criminals and
as a result caused a shift in the type of malicious actors in the Internet. Malware
are increasingly developed by cybercriminal groups that mirror legitimate businesses
in their organisational structure and processes. These groups target large masses of
users with advanced techniques in the effort to reach maximal returns of investment.
Malware infections that leverage remote controllability through Command and
Control communication have become the primary means for financially motivated
cybercriminals to carry out their operations. Through large-scale infection campaigns
and remote controllability victim machines can be harnessed to perform profitable
malicious activities, such as theft of confidential information, spam email distribution
or performing disruptive attacks against networks. The success of these operations
relies on the availability of a robust and reliable C&C infrastructure that allows
malicious entities to issue commands to the bot-infected machines. Protecting this
infrastructure against disruptions and take downs is therefore an integral requirement
for cybercriminals in order to ensure continuity of their operations.
Malware C&C communication has been the target of extensive study and defense
efforts by security professionals and researchers. Due to the difficulty of preventing
initial malware infections, detecting and identifying post-compromise C&C activity
offers an effective way of preventing financial damage and theft of confidential data.
Driven by the defense efforts by the security industry, malware authors have been
forced to evolve and come up with novel ways to evade detection. This has shaped
into a constant battle between the attackers and the defenders, where the attackers in
response to defenders’ endeavours repeatedly produce innovative and more resilient
techniques to thwart detection.
Conventional network-based C&C detection techniques rely on invariants in the
observed network traffic. Application-layer carrier protocols for C&C communication,
such as HTTP and IRC, commonly exhibit tags and delimiters into the observeable
traffic, which can be targeted with pattern-based identification techniques. How-
ever, developments in malware suggest that C&C communication is increasingly
characterized by properties that provide covertness for the C&C protocol and at-
tempt to hide invariants from the traffic. A commonly utilized implementation of
this methodology is the use of a non-descriptive carrier protocol to carry the C&C
messages, which have been obfuscated with a custom encryption algorithm. This new
approach for performing covert C&C communication effectively thwarts conventional
pattern-based detection techniques and imposes a detection gap to current intrusion
detection systems.
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Inspired by the new evasion mechanism, this work presents a novel technique
for the detection of encrypted C&C channels. The presented technique, network
fingerprints, leverages side-channel information leaked in transmitted C&C mes-
sages and uses these to identify similar sequences of C&C protocol messages in
networks. This work focuses in the creation of a proof of concept system that is
able to analyse network traffic and to automatically produce signature candidates
for network fingerprints. This process involves the designing and constructing of
a multistep analysis pipeline, which processes raw traffic captures and produces
network fingerprint signatures for the Suricata intrusion detection system.
This methodology for C&C detection was put into practice and a proof of concept
system was realized. The established analysis pipeline incorporates a protocol filtering
stage at the beginning, where source data provided by sandbox analysis environments
is filtered in order to produce a dataset that fits the scope of the work. The filtering
is performed with protocol parsers that discard known application-layer protocol
implementations, and thereby produce a dataset that consists of network traffic
that implements custom or unknown application-layer protocols. This data is input
to a clustering phase where payload size sequences are extracted from traffic flows
and used as the correlating factor in a grouping operation. The clustering phase
produces sets of grouped network flows, where each group is characterized by an
intercorrelating sequence of payload sizes. This information is utilized in a signature
generation phase, where additional side-channel information, particularly entropy, is
extracted from the grouped flows and used as additional properties to provide an
accurate description of the groups. The signature generation phase produces network
signatures that incorporate the payload size and entropy information of the clustered
packet sequences. The automatically generated network signatures undergo manual
analysis where they are refined and improved to match more accurately on respective
targeted threats. This process is facilitated by a specially built visualisation of
the clusters that allows a comprehensive and interactive analysis on the created
signatures. After manual analysis, the refined signatures are converted into the
signature format supported and employed by the Suricata intrusion detection system.
This process creates an efficient representation of the network fingerprints, which
leverages the scriptability of Suricata with Lua. The converted signatures are then
distributed and deployed to network sensors that employ the generated network
fingerprints in network intrusion detection.
The proof of concept system was tested and validated using the production
environment that was available in the context of this work. Several network fingerprint
signatures were deployed to Suricata sensors in real-world networks and validated
against the expectated outcomes that were set for the technique. During the testing
period altogether 80 events were generated by two of the five network fingerprints
that were deployed. One detector produced 71 true positive detection events, while
the other produced 9 false positive events. Manual verification of the true positive
events confirmed that the traffic matched with the detector would evade conventional
pattern-based detection. The 9 false positive events indicate that the requirements for
reliable and accurate network fingerprints still need refining and serve as a valuable
asset for future development. The effects on the performance of Suricata were verified
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through automatic performance tests. In the tests Suricata was subjected to heavy
loads of HTTP and SSL traffic when running a configuration that supports network
fingerprints and without. The test results show that the performance penalties
induced by the network fingerprints on Suricata include of a 2–9 % overall increase
in packet loss and a minor increase in the CPU load. Even though the proof of
concept could be tested only for a short period of time and with a very limited set
of detectors, the results indicate that the established network fingerprint technique
fulfills the goals set for this research and constitutes a feasible approach for detecting
encrypted C&C channels.
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A DBSCAN implementation
1 #!/usr/bin/env python
2 import numpy
3 from sklearn.neighbors import KDTree
4
5
6 class DBSCAN(object):
7 UNVISITED = 0
8 NOISE = -1
9
10 def __init__(self , eps=5, minpts =5):
11 """
12 :param eps: radius that defines the neighborhood
13 of a point
14 :param minpts: minimum number of points in a
15 neighborhood to create a cluster
16 """
17 self.eps = eps
18 self.minpts = minpts
19
20 self.neighborhoods = None
21 self.labels = None
22 self.core_points = None
23 self.tree = None
24
25 def scan(self , dataset):
26 """
27 Run dbscan on a given dataset. Returns a list of
28 labels , where each label at an index i points the
29 cluster number for the point at index i in the
30 dataset. The algorithm uses euclidean distance as
31 the distance metric for the region query.
32
33 :param dataset: numpy.ndarray , set of points in
34 space. Rows correspond to points ,
35 while columns specify the offset
36 on the axes.
37 :rtype: numpy.array , numpy.array , integer
38 :returns: A list of labels (1-N for clusters , -1
39 for outliers), list of indexes of the
40 cluster corepoints , number of clusters
41 """
42 self.tree = KDTree(dataset)
43
44 self.labels = numpy.zeros(
71
45 dataset.shape[0], dtype="int64")
46 self.core_points = numpy.zeros_like(
47 self.labels , dtype="bool")
48 nclusters = 1
49
50 for index , dummy in enumerate(dataset):
51 if self.labels[index] != self.UNVISITED:
52 continue
53
54 is_cluster = self._expand_cluster(
55 dataset , index , nclusters)
56 if is_cluster:
57 nclusters += 1
58
59 return self.labels , self.core_points , nclusters -1
60
61 def _get_neighbors(self , dataset , index , nclusters):
62 """
63 Find unvisited neighbors , or neighbors that have
64 been tagged as noise. Don’t return points that
65 already belong to other clusters to avoid
66 problems with border points.
67
68 :param dataset: numpy.ndarray , set of points in
69 space. Rows correspond to points ,
70 while columns specify the offset
71 on the axes.
72 :param index: Offset in the dataset for the
73 current point.
74 :param nclusters: Current cluster number.
75 :rtype: list
76 :returns: list containing indexes of all
77 neighboring points that are within a
78 self.eps radius of the point
79 """
80 neighbors = self.tree.query_radius(
81 dataset[index], self.eps)[0]. tolist ()
82
83 return [
84 i for i in neighbors
85 if self.labels[i] in [
86 nclusters , self.UNVISITED , self.NOISE ]]
87
88 def _expand_cluster(self , dataset , index , nclusters):
89 """
90 Actual clustering function. Decide whether a point
91 forms a cluster by searching its neighbors and
92 their neighbors. Mark all such neighbors
72
93 belonging to the same cluster and points that have
94 more than self.minpts neighbors as core points of
95 the clusters.
96
97 :param dataset: numpy.ndarray , set of points in
98 space. Rows correspond to points ,
99 while columns specify the offset
100 on the axes.
101 :param index: Offset in the dataset for the
102 current point.
103 :param nclusters: Current cluster number.
104 :rtype: Boolean
105 :returns: True if the current point forms a
106 cluster , else False.
107 """
108 neighbors = self._get_neighbors(
109 dataset , index , nclusters)
110
111 if len(neighbors) >= self.minpts:
112 # Hunt down identicals in order not to choke
113 # on them in the loop
114 identicals = self._get_identical_points(
115 dataset , index , neighbors)
116
117 # Identicals form the base of the new cluster
118 processed = set(identicals)
119 self.labels[identicals] = nclusters
120 self.core_points[identicals] = True
121
122 add = processed.add
123 for neighbor in neighbors:
124
125 if neighbor not in processed:
126 add(neighbor)
127
128 self.labels[neighbor] = nclusters
129
130 extended = self._get_neighbors(
131 dataset , neighbor , nclusters)
132
133 if len(extended) < self.minpts:
134 continue
135
136 identicals = \
137 self._get_identical_points(
138 dataset , neighbor , extended)
139
140 processed = \
73
141 processed.union(identicals)
142
143 self.labels[identicals] = nclusters
144 self.core_points[identicals] = True
145
146 neighbors += (list(set(extended) -
147 set(neighbors)))
148
149 return True
150 else:
151 self.labels[index] = self.NOISE
152 return False
153
154 def _get_identical_points(self , dataset , index ,
155 neighbors):
156 """
157 Get identical points to a point. The returned list
158 always contains also the point itself.
159
160 :param dataset: numpy.ndarray , set of points in
161 space. Rows correspond to points ,
162 while columns specify the offset
163 on the axes.
164 :param index: Offset in the dataset for the
165 current point.
166 :param neighbors: List of point indexes in the
167 dataset.
168 :rtype: list
169 :returns: List containing identical elements with
170 a point , i.e. points that share same
171 coordinates as the point.
172 """
173 point = dataset[index]
174 return [
175 i for i in neighbors
176 if numpy.array_equal(dataset[i], point)]
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B Pseudocode for computation of signature
tuples
1 ENTROPY_MARGIN = 0.2
2 ENTROPY_THRESHOLD = 6.6
3 STDEVIATION_THRESHOLD = 0.1
4 tuples = []
5
6 for i in range(1, D):
7 tuple_values = []
8
9 # Insert payload size constraint
10 if len(set(payload_sizes[i])) == 1:
11 # Unique value
12 tuple_values.append(str(payload_sizes[i][0]))
13 else:
14 # Range
15 min_ = min(payload_sizes[i])
16 max_ = max(payload_sizes[i])
17 range_ = "{:d}<>{:d}".format(min_ - 1, max_ + 1)
18 tuple_values.append(range_)
19
20 # Insert entropy constraint
21 if len(set(entropy_values[i])) == 1:
22 # Unique value
23 entropy = entropy_values[i][0]
24 range_ = "{:d}<>{:d}".format(
25 entropy - ENTROPY_MARGIN ,
26 entropy + ENTROPY_MARGIN)
27 tuple_values.append(range_)
28 elif stdeviation <= STDEVIATION_THRESHOLD:
29 # Small standard deviation
30 if mean(entropy_values[i]) >= ENTROPY_THRESHOLD:
31 min_ = min(entropy_values[i])
32 range_ = " >{:d}".format(min_ - stdeviation)
33 tuple_values.append(range_)
34 else:
35 min_ = min(entropy_values[i])
36 max_ = max(entropy_values[i])
37 range_ = "{:d}<>{:d}".format(
38 min_ - stdeviation ,
39 max_ + stdeviation)
40 tuple_values.append(range_)
41
42 tuples.append(tuple(tuple_values))
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C Suricata signatures for network fingerprints
# Network fingerprint client transaction Lua script
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:" Network
fingerprint client transaction Lua script ";
flow:established , to_server; flowbits:set ,fingerprint_lua;
flowint:fingerprint_disable ,notset; lua:fingerprint.lua;
flowbits:noalert ;)
# Network fingerprint server transaction Lua script
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:" Network
fingerprint server transaction Lua script ";
flow:established , to_server;
flowbits:set ,fingerprint_server_lua;
flowint:fingerprint_disable ,notset;
lua:fingerprint_server.lua; flowbits:noalert ;)
# Network fingerprint Suricata signatures
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:" Network
fingerprint signature #1 (no alert)";
flowbits:isset ,fingerprint_lua;
flow:established ,to_server; flowint:client.idx ,==,1;
dsize :141; flowint:client.entropy ,>,550;
flowbits:set ,NF.1; flowbits: noalert ;)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:" Network
fingerprint signature #2 (no alert)"; flowbits:isset ,NF.1;
flowbits:isset ,fingerprint_lua;
flow:established ,to_server; flowint:client.idx ,==,2;
dsize :97; flowint:client.entropy ,>,550;
flowbits:unset ,NF.1; flowbits:set ,NF.2; flowbits: noalert ;)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:" Network
fingerprint signature #3 (no alert)"; flowbits:isset ,NF.2;
flowbits:isset ,fingerprint_lua;
flow:established ,to_server; flowint:client.idx ,==,3;
dsize :23<>37; flowbits:unset ,NF.2; flowbits:set ,NF.3;
flowbits: noalert ;)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:" Network
fingerprint signature #4"; flowbits:isset ,NF.3;
flowbits:isset ,fingerprint_lua;
flow:established ,to_server; flowint:client.idx ,==,4;
dsize :65; flowbits:unset ,NF.3;)
